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This Article seeks to fill a critical gap in the current literature relating 
to the international ordering of cyberspace:  the link between jurisdictional 
assertions by realspace sovereigns and their effects on the global effort to 
administer the Internet. We analyze the United States’ response to disputes 
over domain names, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
(“ACPA”), which permits a trademark owner to seek cancellation or trans-
fer of the domain name by proceeding in rem against the domain name 
itself, thereby expanding the scope of the ACPA to encompass disputes 
with little direct connection to the United States. Congress appears to have 
developed 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2) based on a misunderstanding of the 
constitutional requirements for adjudicative jurisdiction in the U.S. courts; 
and early court decisions interpreting the provision have perpetuated the 
misunderstanding. This Article argues that there exist no cases of foreign 
cybersquatting (aside from certain cases involving anonymous registrants) 
as to which the in rem provision will be both applicable and constitutional. 
The ACPA is notable for its aggressive approach to jurisdiction, and its 
expansive view of jurisdiction reveals the extent to which realspace sover-
eigns have a critical, and yet overlooked, role in the continued viability of 
a global unsegmented domain name system. By mapping the logical con-
trol over the domain name system—the distributed hierarchy that is the 
basis of the system’s design—onto realspace territory, the potential for 
sovereign regulation of the system becomes apparent, either under the rec-
ognized principles of prescriptive jurisdiction in international law or as a 
de facto result of the geographic facts of the domain name system. We 
contend that the ACPA exemplifies uncoordinated actions that are likely 
to result in segmentation of the domain name system and thus a decline in 
social welfare. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the era of the global Internet, realspace sovereigns face new prob-
lems relating to the scope and enforceability of their laws, many of which 
are intended to protect local individuals and commercial entities. How 
these traditional sovereigns respond to these challenges will have far-
reaching implications for the ordering of social and economic behavior 
online.1  In this piece, we take up the case of the domain name system as 
an example of challenges and solutions yet to come.  
                                                                                                                         
 1. There have been many contributions to this field. See, e.g., David Post & David 
Johnson, Law & Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 
(1996); Jack Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998); Marga-
ret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal 
Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1998); David Johnson & David 
Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed? A Meditation on the Relative Virtues of De-
centralized, Emergent Law, in COORDINATING THE INTERNET (Brian Kahin & James Kel-
ler eds., 1997); Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for Cyberspace, 55 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 993 (1994); Henry R Perrit, Jr. The Internet is Changing International Law, 73 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997 (1998); A Michael Froomkin, Of Governments and Governance, 
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617 (1999); A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of 
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We begin by critically analyzing the United States’ response to inter-
national disputes over domain names, especially the Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”).2 The ACPA offers a number of po-
tential remedies to United States trademark owners whose marks are regis-
tered as domain names by alleged cybersquatters, both domestic and for-
eign. It asserts both adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction over foreign 
registrants.3 This Article takes up each of those assertions in turn. 
Looking first at the ACPA’s provisions with respect to adjudicative ju-
risdiction, Part II focuses on 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2). This provision pur-
ports to authorize a trademark owner to seek cancellation or transfer of a 
domain name by proceeding “in rem” against the domain name itself in 
cases where the U.S. courts cannot assert personal jurisdiction over the 
alleged cybersquatter. The text and history of the provision indicate that 
Congress intended to authorize in rem proceedings in cases where a for-
eign registrant’s lack of contacts with the United States would render a 
U.S. court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over the registrant unconsti-
tutional under the Due Process Clause. However, as we discuss below, in 
such cases the registrant’s lack of U.S. contacts will render i  r m jurisdic-
tion unconstitutional as well. The ACPA’s in rem provision, therefore, 
fails effectively to reach the cases Congress appears to be targeting.4  
                                                                                                                        
Regulatory Arbitrage (book chapter) in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE (Brian Kahin & 
Charles Nesson eds., 1997); Jonathan Weinberg, Internet Governance, in TRANSNA-
TIONAL CYBERSPACE LAW (Makoto Ibusuki ed., 2000); Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and 
the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (2000); Milton Mueller, ICANN and Inter-
net Governance: Sorting Through the Debris of Self-Regulation. 1 INFO 477-500, (1999). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 106-113, Division B, §1000(a)(9), & Appendix I, Title III, § 
3002(a), 113 Stat. 1501, 1531-36, 1501A-521, 1501A-545-48 (1999) (codified in relevant 
part at 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)). 
 3. The term “prescriptive jurisdiction” denotes the power to legislate, while the 
term “adjudicative jurisdiction” refers to the power of a court to hear and determine a 
matter.  See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 
(5th ed. 1998). 
 4. In a recent article, Suzanna Sherry argues that the ACPA, “while not unconstitu-
tional, [is] shortsighted.” Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Com-
mon Law in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 311 (2002). Professor Sherry notes that 
some courts have found in rem jurisdiction available under the ACPA despite finding 
insufficient contacts between the registrant and the forum to justify in personam jurisdic-
tion. See id. at 340. Sherry seems agnostic on the question discussed in Part II below: 
whether an in rem suit can proceed in the absence of minimum contacts between the reg-
istrant and the forum. See id. at 343 (noting one court’s conclusion “that the minimum 
contacts test of International Shoe applie[s] to in rem as well as quasi in rem actions,” 
but taking no position on “[w]hether or not that is a fair reading of Shaffer”). Instead, 
Sherry argues that the ACPA’s in rem provision is redundant because in cases where 
courts have proceeded under the ACPA’s in rem provisions, “it is probable that in the 
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Apart from its constitutional deficiencies, though, the in rem provision 
is conceptually intriguing because it turns on the assertion that the res in 
question (the domain name) is located within the forum (the United 
States). The ACPA thus attempts to base in rem jurisdiction on the prem-
ise that a domain name is located in the United States whenever either the 
dealer or the administrator involved in registering or assigning the domain 
name is U.S.-based.5 The theoretical and practical problems with such an 
approach lead naturally to our consideration of the implications of Con-
gress’s assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction over domain name disputes, 
and, more broadly, the role of realspace sovereigns in domain name regu-
lation. 
Our analysis of prescriptive jurisdiction begins by describing the as-
pects of logical control6 over the domain name system. The technological 
facts of the domain name system (in particular the hierarchy in the sys-
tem’s design7) correlate control over certain components (especially the 
root servers) with effective control over the entire system. By mapping 
this logical control structure onto the contours of realspace, the potential 
regulatory authority of realspace sovereigns becomes apparent. This regu-
latory authority can be grounded in either the widely-accepted principles 
of prescriptive jurisdiction or the de facto result of the physical location of 
elements of the domain name system. In the prescriptive jurisdiction case, 
the location of certain elements, specifically the root or TLD servers,8 
within a sovereign’s territory will in almost all cases provide at least sub-
                                                                                                                        
absence of the ACPA the courts would have examined the precedent more carefully and 
found the requisite personal jurisdiction over the defendants.” Id. at 340. 
 5. The terms used by the ACPA are “registrar” and “registry.” See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(d)(2)(A). To help distinguish the functions of these two entities, we use the terms 
“dealer” and “administrator.” See infra note 39. 
 6. By “logical control” we refer to the power conferred by the technological fea-
tures of the domain name system. 
 7. The domain name system is designed as a “distributed hierarchy,” with a very 
large number of components relying on a small number of “root servers” for critical in-
formation. See infra notes 131-137 and accompanying text. 
 8. “TLD” stands for “top level domain.” As one of us has explained previously: 
Internet domain names take the form "[host].[domain].[top-level-domain]." For 
example, "www.stanford.edu," where "www" is known as the hostname, "stan-
ford" is the domain name, and "edu" is the top-level-domain name, or "TLD." 
Because each Internet domain name corresponds uniquely to what is known as 
an "IP address," a series of numbers that is the means by which transmissions 
are routed through the Internet, the domain names themselves are normally used 
as addresses. There are a limited number of TLDs, .com being the best known 
. . . .  
Radin & Wagner, supra note 1, at 1298 n.8. 
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stantial international legal support for the assertion of jurisdiction. Even if 
a sovereign’s jurisdictional claim is not formally recognized or is contro-
versial, de facto control can be exerted via the reality of the technology 
and geography. In either event, the same basic point holds: geography 
matters. 
Importantly, however, while geography may influence the “territorial” 
control over the domain name system, from a technological standpoint it is 
largely irrelevant. The geographic facts of the domain name system are 
uniquely mutable. This provides both the means and the incentive for real-
space sovereigns to increase their regulatory authority by altering the geo-
graphic facts—in our example, by creating and mandating an alternative 
root server system. Part IV argues that this ability to exert regulatory in-
fluence should concern the global Internet community because the crea-
tion of alternative root servers will likely result in the segmentation of the 
domain name system and a concomitant reduction in its value. 
The importance of realspace sovereigns in the regulation of the domain 
name system calls for a reconsideration of the present regulatory ap-
proaches. In particular, the United States, which arguably stands to lose 
the most from the segmentation of the domain name system, should pursue 
international coordination of domain names regulation, rather than the ex-
tensive assertion of jurisdiction found in the ACPA. This Article con-
cludes with suggestions and observations about the steps that the United 
States in particular, and realspace sovereigns more generally, might take to 
effectuate a policy that reflects the substantial interest in an unsegmented 
domain name system.  
II. JURISDICTIONAL OVERREACHING:  THE 
ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ACT 
 
In 1999, Congress addressed the problem of “cybersquatting”9 by 
passing the ACPA, which prohibits bad-faith registration of a domain 
name consisting of another’s mark.10  However, noting the difficulties of 
suing foreign or anonymous domain name registrants, Congress also cre-
ated an unusual procedural device for use in cases where the registrant 
                                                                                                                        
 9. “Cybersquatting” occurs when a person registers as a domain name a word or 
phrase trademarked by another and does so in the hope of either selling the domain name 
to the trademark holder or earning advertising revenue from the visits of web users who 
are looking for the trademark holder’s web page. Se  Sherry, supra note 4, at 317-18. 
 10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).  
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cannot be located or subjected to the jurisdiction of a United States court. 
In such cases, the ACPA authorizes the mark holder to bring an in 
rem suit11 directly against the domain name itself.12 Although the available 
legislative history indicates that Congress believed that the in 
rem provision would close a gap in the enforcement tools available to 
mark holders, in reality this provision adds little to the preexisting jurisdic-
tional bases for ACPA suits. The analysis that follows examines the juris-
                                                                                                                         
 11. In an in personam action, jurisdiction flows from the court’s authority over the 
defendant’s “person” and any resulting judgment is potentially enforceable against any 
assets of the defendant, wherever located. By contrast, in an i  rem action of the type 
authorized by the ACPA, jurisdiction is based on the court’s authority over the res—here, 
the domain name—rather than on authority over the defendant’s person. Thus, any judg-
ment in an in rem action is limited to the value of the r s and the judgment can be en-
forced only against the res and not against any other interests of the defendant. See, e.g., 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & A RTHUR R. MILLER, 4A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: CIVIL 3D § 1070, at 281 (2002) (discussing distinctions between in rem and in per-
sonam actions). 
 12. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A). The ACPA purports to authorize “an in rem civil 
action.” Id. Technically, the suit authorized by the ACPA should be termed a quasi in 
rem Type 1 action, because it determines the relative rights of the plaintiff and the regis-
trant in the res and not the plaintiff’s rights in the res as against all the world. See Hanson 
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958) (noting that “[a] judgment quasi in rem affects 
the interests of particular persons in designated property,” and that in one type of quasi in 
rem suit, “the plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property 
and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular persons”). 
  One district court has recently taken a different view, arguing that “ACPA in 
rem actions . . . are of the ‘true in rem’ genre because they involve the rights of a disputed 
mark for every potential rights holder.” Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 162 
F. Supp. 2d 484, 490 (E.D. Va. 2001). This assessment seems at odds with the structure 
of the ACPA’s in rem provisions. The notice requirements set forth in those provisions 
focus on the domain name registrant, and no one else: they require that the plaintiff send 
notice of the suit to the registrant and “publish[] notice of the action as the court may 
direct,” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii), measures which would satisfy the due process 
requirements for notice of suit with respect to the registrant, but not necessarily with re-
spect to other entities that might have claims to the domain name. 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d)(2)(A)(ii). Similarly, the ACPA claims turn on the conduct of the registrant, 
rather than on the relative rights of the plaintiff and any person other than the registrant. 
Moreover, the ACPA provides that a successful in rem plaintiff may obtain forfeiture, 
cancellation or transfer of the domain name, but the statute does not suggest that a suc-
cessful ACPA plaintiff is thereby immunized from claims by any other person asserting a 
superior right to the domain name. 
  In any event, the distinction between in rem actions and quasi in rem Type 1 
actions does not affect our analysis of the ACPA’s provisions. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6 cmt. a (1980) (questioning “whether the traditional distinction is 
useful for any purpose”). Accordingly, for simplicity we will use the term “in rem” to 
describe the ACPA’s provisions. Cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 n.17 (1977) 
(for convenience, using “in rem” to denote both in rem and quasi in rem). 
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dictional significance of the in rem provision, and concludes that its great-
est distinction lies not in its utility (which is minimal, due to constitutional 
problems) but rather in its approach to the location of domain names. 
A. The mechanics of the ACPA 
To prevail on a claim under the ACPA, a plaintiff must show that it 
owns a protected mark, and that the defendant registered, trafficked in, or 
used a domain name that is identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive 
of the plaintiff’s mark.13 The ACPA also requires the plaintiff to establish 
that the defendant acted with “bad faith intent to profit from th[e] mark.”14 
To assist courts in assessing the element of bad faith, the Act includes a 
nonexhaustive list of nine factors.15 Finally, the Act provides a “safe har-
bor” for registrants who “believed and had reasonable grounds to believe 
that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful.”16 
Where the prohibited acts occurred prior to the Act’s passage, the only 
remedies available are forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name, or 
transfer of the domain name to the mark owner.17 For violations that occur 
after the date of enactment, the Act authorizes the award of damages and 
                                                                                                                        
 13. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).  More specifically, the ACPA applies only to 
domain names that meet one of the following three sets of criteria: (1) a domain name 
that is “identical or confusingly similar to” a mark “that is distinctive at the time of regis-
tration of the domain name”; (2) a domain name that is “identical or confusingly similar 
to or dilutive of” a famous mark “that is famous at the time of registration of the domain 
name”; or (3) a domain name that “is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of 
section 706 of Title 18 [pertaining to the Red Cross] or section 220506 of Title 36 [per-
taining to the Olympics].” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii). 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).  
 15. The factors include: whether the registrant has an intellectual property right to 
the domain name; the extent to which the domain name is commonly used to identify the 
registrant; whether the registrant has previously used the domain name in offering goods 
or services; the registrant’s fair use of the mark in a site accessed by means of the domain 
name; whether the registrant intended to divert web users from the plaintiff’s website to 
the website accessed by means of the domain name; evidence that the registrant’s intent 
was to sell, not use, the domain name; the registrant’s failure to provide accurate contact 
information; the registrant’s acquisition of multiple domain names that resemble pro-
tected marks; and whether the plaintiff’s mark is distinctive and famous. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(i). 
 16. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
 17. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C); Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 106-113, Appendix I, Title III, § 3010, 113 Stat. 1501A-552 (1999) (provid-
ing that damages remedy “shall not be available with respect to the registration, traffick-
ing, or use of a domain name that occurs before the date of the enactment of this Act”); 
Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The 
only remedy available for ACPA violations that occurred before November 29, 1999 . . . 
is to have the domain name transferred to the owner of the mark or canceled”). 
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costs,18 and permits the plaintiff to elect statutory damages of $1,000 to 
$100,000, as determined by the court.19 If appropriate, the court may 
award treble damages, and in exceptional cases the court may also award a 
reasonable attorney’s fee.20 
B. Anonymous registrants 
The ACPA’s drafters believed that the remedies described above 
would do little good if the plaintiff was unable to discover the registrant’s 
identity. The House Committee report noted that “a significant problem 
faced by trademark owners in the fight against cybersquatting is the fact 
that many cybersquatters register domain names under aliases or otherwise 
provide false information in their registration applications in order to 
avoid identification and service of process by the mark owner.”21 The fed-
eral courts traditionally have disfavored suits against anonymous defen-
dants, and a plaintiff usually must identify and locate the defendant in or-
der to effect service of process.22  
A suit initiated prior to the passage of the ACPA, Columbia Insurance 
Co. v. Seescandy.com,23 illustrates the problem of anonymous defendants. 
The assignee of various trademarks associated with See’s Candy Shops, 
Inc. sued in federal court, asserting federal and state law claims arising 
from the registration of the domain names seescandy.com and see-
candys.com by “someone other than the plaintiff.”24 Because the registrant 
had provided incomplete or false information when registering the domain 
names, the plaintiff was unable “to collect the information necessary to 
serve the complaint” on the registrant.25 The district court recognized the 
plaintiff’s need to ascertain the registrant’s identity, but it balanced this 
need against “the legitimate and valuable right to participate in online fo-
                                                                                                                        
 18. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (providing that an ACPA plaintiff may recover “(1) 
defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the 
action”). 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d). 
 20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 487 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(affirming award of attorney’s fees under ACPA). 
 21. H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14 (1999). 
 22. See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577-78 (N.D. 
Cal. 1999) (noting “traditional reluctance for permitting filings against John Doe defen-
dants or fictitious names” and stating that “the default requirement in federal court is that 
the plaintiff must be able to identify the defendant sufficiently that a summons can be 
served on the defendant”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 575. 
 25. Id. at 577. 
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rums anonymously or pseudonymously.”26 As a result, the court held that 
the plaintiff must satisfy a four-part test in order to get discovery on the 
issue.27 
The ACPA’s in rem provision addresses the anonymous defendant 
problem by removing the need to identify an evasive registrant. Under 
§ 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II), a mark owner who has an ACPA claim against a 
domain name registrant may sue the domain name instead of the regis-
trant, if the owner is unable to find the registrant by sending a notice to the 
postal and email addresses provided by the registrant to the dealer.28 Th  
Act’s requirements that the plaintiff send the notice to the addresses pro-
vided by the registrant, coupled with the additional requirement that the 
plaintiff publish notice of the action,29 satisfy the due process require-
ments for notice of suit.30 Thus, in situations where the registrant cannot 
be identified, the in rem provision holds the promise of “provid[ing] 
meaningful protection to trademark owners while balancing the interests 
of privacy and anonymity on the Internet.”31 
                                                                                                                        
 26. Id. at 578. 
 27. First, the plaintiff “should identify the missing party with sufficient specificity 
such that the Court can determine that defendant is a real person or entity who could be 
sued in federal court.” Id. Second, the plaintiff should “identify all previous steps taken to 
locate the elusive defendant." Id. at 579. Third, plaintiff should show that its claims 
“could withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. Fourth, the plaintiff should specify, and jus-
tify, the discovery requests and the entities to which those requests would be addressed. 
Id. at 580.  
 28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II). 
 29. The ACPA requires that the plaintiff in an in rem ACPA suit “send[] a notice of 
the alleged violation and intent to proceed under [the ACPA in rem provisions] to the 
registrant of the domain name at the postal and e-mail address provided by the registrant 
to the registrar; and . . . publish[] notice of the action as the court may direct promptly 
after filing the action.” Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II).  
 30. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (re-
quiring “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their ob-
jections”). Although the ACPA’s notice provisions will probably fail to provide actual 
notice to a registrant who provides false or incomplete contact information to the dealer, 
or who fails to keep that information current, such a failure should not raise a due process 
problem. Cf. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 (1983) (approving statutory notice 
scheme, despite its failure to provide actual notice to appellant, because “the right to re-
ceive notice was completely within appellant’s control”). 
 31. 145 CONG. REC. S10513-02, S10516 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch). Senator Hatch noted that “some have suggested that dissidents or others who are 
online incognito for similar legitimate reasons might give false information to protect 
themselves and have suggested the need to preserve a degree of anonymity on the Inter-
net particularly for this reason.” Id. The in rem provision addresses this concern by “de-
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C. Registrants over whom in personam jurisdiction is unavailable 
In addition to the problem of anonymous registrants, the ACPA’s 
drafters also intended to tackle cases where “a non-U.S. resident cyber-
squats on a domain name that infringes upon a U.S. trademark.”32 To this 
end, § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) provides that the in rem action is also available 
if the mark owner is unable to obtain i  personam jurisdiction over the 
registrant.33 The problem with this provision, as we demonstrate below, is 
that there exist no cases of foreign cybersquatting as to which 
§ 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) is both applicable and constitutional. As we discuss 
in Part II.C.1, in order for a court to have territorial jurisdiction in a par-
ticular case, there must be a basis for jurisdiction, and the exercise of that 
jurisdiction must be constitutional. A review of the pertinent rules shows 
that if the exercise of such jurisdiction is constitutional, there will always 
be a basis for in personam jurisdiction over ACPA claims against foreign 
registrants. Thus, § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I)’s requirement that in personam 
jurisdiction be unavailable is satisfied only in cases where the exercise of 
in personam jurisdiction would violate due process. Part II.C.2 surveys the 
due process requirements for in personam jurisdiction, and Part II.C.3 ar-
gues that the same due process requirements apply to in rem suits under 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer v. Heitner.34 Thus, Part II.C con-
cludes that in any ACPA case where the exercise of in personam jurisdic-
tion would violate due process, the exercise of in rem jurisdiction will be 
unconstitutional as well. 
1. Bases for jurisdiction 
For suits in federal court,35 the basis for personal jurisdiction is found 
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. So long as the exercise of jurisdic-
tion comports with due process, all in personam ACPA actions will fit 
within either Rule 4(k)(1)(A) or Rule 4(k)(2).36 Rule 4(k)(1)(A) authorizes 
                                                                                                                        
creas[ing] the need for trademark owners to join the hunt to chase down and root out 
these dissidents or others seeking anonymity on the Net.” Id. 
 32. H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14 (1999). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
 34. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 35. It appears that the federal and state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over n 
personam suits under the ACPA. Cf. Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light 
Co., 84 F.3d 1388, 1394 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that federal courts do not have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over Lanham Act claims). For purposes of simplicity, this article focuses 
on ACPA suits brought in federal court. 
 36. Neither the ACPA nor the Lanham Act addresses the question of service of 
process for in personam actions. See, e.g., ISI Int’l, Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 
256 F.3d 548, 550 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that Lanham Act does not authorize worldwide 
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service of process on a defendant “who could be subjected to the jurisdic-
tion of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court 
is located.”37 Thus, if a foreign registrant’s contacts with a particular state 
in the U.S. meet the criteria of that state’s long-arm statute, and if the 
minimum contacts and reasonableness requirements of due process are 
met, then Rule 4(k)(1)(A) will provide a basis for the assertion of territo-
rial jurisdiction with respect to the claim against that registrant. If the facts 
of the case do not fit the relevant state’s long-arm statute, or if the regis-
trant lacks minimum contacts with the relevant state, then the plaintiff can 
turn to Rule 4(k)(2). Rule 4(k)(2) authorizes service of process on a for-
eign defendant, in a federal question case, provided that the defendant is 
not subject to jurisdiction in the courts of any state, and provided that the 
exercise of jurisdiction “is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.”38 The use of Rule 4(k)(2) is “consistent with” the ACPA 
because nothing in the ACPA forbids worldwide service of process on an 
in personam defendant. However, the use of Rule 4(k)(2) to authorize in 
personam jurisdiction over ACPA claims against a foreign registrant may 
violate due process, in which event Rule 4(k)(2) is, by its own terms, in-
applicable. In sum, Rule 4 will always provide a basis for in personam ju-
risdiction over ACPA claims against foreign registrants, unless the exer-
cise of such jurisdiction violates due process. It is to the constitutional 
analysis, thus, that we now turn. 
2. Constitutionality of in personam jurisdiction 
In personam suits against foreign registrants may be constitutional in a 
number of situations, including cases where the domain name was regis-
tered with a U.S.-based dealer.39 In other instances, such as where the reg-
                                                                                                                        
service of process); Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Int’l Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1110 
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (reaching similar conclusion in suit involving claims under Lanham Act 
and ACPA). Thus, Rule 4(k)(1)(D), which permits service of process “when authorized 
by a statute of the United States,” is inapplicable.  
 37. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).  
 38. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). 
 39. A brief discussion of terminology may be helpful. “Registrars” are entities au-
thorized by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) to 
register domain names on behalf of registrants; they function as intermediaries between 
the individual registrants and the domain name “registry.” See Fleetboston Fin. Corp. v. 
Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 123 n.2 (D. Mass. 2001) (discussing dis-
tinctions between registrars and registries). While there are multiple registrars, not all of 
which are based in the U.S., each TLD has only one registry, which maintains the single 
authoritative set of records concerning domain names and their registrants. See id. 
Verisign Global Registry Services, a Virginia-based corporation, operates the registry for 
the .com, .org, and .net TLDs, which account for a very substantial number of all current 
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istrant uses a foreign-based dealer, due process requirements will often not 
be met. To meet the requirements of due process, a defendant must pos-
sess minimum contacts with the United States40 and the exercise of juris-
diction must not be unreasonable.41 The minimum contacts requirement, 
                                                                                                                         
domain names. See Verisign Contact Information, at http://www.verisigngrs.com/-
aboutus/contact.html (last visited July 25, 2002) (stating that Verisign is headquartered in 
Virginia); Smith v. Network Solutions, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1161 & n.2 (N.D. Ala. 
2001) (discussing Verisign Global Registry Services’ role as registry for the .com, .org, 
and .net TLDs); Verisign Corporate Overview, http://www.verisign.com/corporate/about-
/index.html (visited July 25, 2002) (asserting that .com, .org and .net domain names rep-
resent 27.3 million web addresses). Thus, the relevant registrar may be either a U.S.-
based or a foreign corporation, but the pertinent registry for most current domain names 
is controlled by a U.S.-based corporation. To help distinguish between the two types of 
entities, we will generally refer to the registrar as the “dealer” and the registry as the 
“administrator.” 
 40. The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether a defendant’s contacts with 
various parts of the United States can be aggregated for purposes of the due process 
analysis under the Fifth Amendment. See Omni Capital International, Ltd. v. Rudolf 
Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987) (unanimous opinion) (declining “to consider 
the constitutional issues raised by” litigant’s contention that “a federal court could exer-
cise personal jurisdiction, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, based on an aggregation 
of the defendant's contacts with the Nation as a whole, rather than on its contacts with the 
State in which the federal court sits”); Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 
102, 113 n.* (1987) (O’Connor, J., joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell 
and Scalia) (finding “no occasion . . . to determine whether Congress could, consistent 
with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal 
jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of nati nal contacts, rather than 
on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits”). It 
appears, however, that when a foreign defendant is sued under a federal statute authoriz-
ing nationwide or worldwide service of process, the court may aggregate all of the defen-
dant’s United States contacts in order to assess whether the assertion of jurisdiction 
would comport with due process under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Go-Video Inc. v. 
Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “when a [federal] stat-
ute authorizes nationwide service of process, national contacts analysis is appropriate”). 
  Thus, in cases where the defendant lacks minimum contacts with the state in 
which the district court sits, but has contacts with other parts of the United States, the 
contacts can be aggregated to satisfy the minimum contacts analysis under Rule 4(k)(2). 
See, e.g., ISI Int’l, 256 F.3d at 551 (holding that federal court can exercise jurisdiction 
under Rule 4(k)(2) over defendant who has “ample contacts with the nation as a whole, 
but whose contacts are so scattered among states that none of them would have jurisdic-
tion”). Likewise, because the ACPA’s quasi in rem section provides for worldwide ser-
vice of process, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)-(B), this article assumes that a federal 
district court asserting jurisdiction under that section should assess whether the defendant 
possesses minimum contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than with the state 
in which the district court sits.  




which is designed to prevent the assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant 
having no significant “contacts, ties, or relations” with the forum,42 is sat-
isfied when a defendant “purposefully direct[s]” its actions at the forum 
and the litigation arises out of or relates to those acts.43  
Several considerations support the argument that a registrant who uses 
a U.S.-based ealer to acquire a domain name creates minimum contacts 
with the United States.44 Although the registrant may communicate with 
the dealer solely over the Internet, the Court has held that minimum con-
tacts may be found even when the defendant never physically enters the 
forum.45 It seems likely that most registrants will be aware of the national-
ity of the dealer they use. The dealer’s website will usually provide rea-
sonable notice that the dealer is a U.S.-based corporation and may even 
reveal the specific location of the dealer’s physical headquarters. In in-
stances where a reasonable person would infer from the dealer’s website 
that the dealer is U.S.-based, registrants who contract with that dealer to 
register a domain name can be seen as purposefully directing their activi-
ties to the United States.46 
                                                                                                                        
 42. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
 43. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); see also Helicop-
teros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). “General jurisdic-
tion,” which exists when a defendant’s contacts with the forum are sufficiently extensive 
to support jurisdiction over claims unrelated to the contacts, will usually not be available 
in ACPA cases involving foreign registrants, since such registrants are unlikely to have 
the requisite “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum. 
 44. Cf. David F. Fanning, Note, Quasi in Rem on the Cyberseas, 76 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1887, 1920 (2001) (arguing that a domain name registrant should be aware “that the 
forum in which her chosen domain name registrar resides has an interest in regulating the 
continuing obligation of the registrar”). 
 45. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (“So long as a commercial actor's efforts are 
‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected 
the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.”). 
 46. Although a defendant’s contract with a forum resident will not always suffice to 
establish minimum contacts, such contacts may be shown by the circumstances of the 
contract. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-79 (explaining that “in determining whether 
the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum,” a court must 
consider factors such as “prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along 
with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing”); McGee v. Int'l 
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (holding that circumstances surrounding insur-
ance contract established minimum contacts where, int r alia, “[t]he contract was deliv-
ered in California, the premiums were mailed from there and the insured was a resident of 
that State when he died”); Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264-65 (6th Cir. 
1996) (finding minimum contacts with Ohio where defendant entered into a contract with 
an Ohio corporation, “purposefully perpetuated the relationship with [the plaintiff] via 
repeated communications with its system in Ohio,” and “used [the plaintiff corporation] 
to market his wares in Ohio and elsewhere”). In ACPA cases, the defendant will have 
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The allegations by which the plaintiff seeks to meet the ACPA’s bad 
faith element47 may establish further contacts between the registrant and 
the United States.48 In assessing whether the plaintiff has properly alleged 
that the registrant acted with a “bad faith intent to profit from [the plain-
tiff’s] mark,” 49 the ACPA advises the court to consider several factors, 
including “the [registrant’s] intent to divert consumers from the mark 
owner's online location to a site accessible under the domain name,”50 and 
“the [registrant's] offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain 
name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain.”51 Where a 
registrant takes such actions against a U.S.-based mark owner,52 th  regis-
trant can be seen as intending to cause an effect within the United States, 
                                                                                                                        
entered into a contract with a U.S. dealer; the registration will have affected U.S. com-
merce; and the defendant may have shown an intent to damage the U.S. business of the 
holder of a mark protected under U.S. law. 
47 47. The statute makes “bad faith” an element of in personam ACPA claims. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1). The ACPA’s in rem provision does not explicitly mention bad faith. 
However, it authorizes a suit in rem if (1) the domain name violates the plaintiff’s trade-
mark rights and (2) the plaintiff is unable to obtain in personam jurisdiction over, or is 
unable to locate, “a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under” the 
ACPA’s in personam provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A). A number of courts have 
concluded that this reference to the in personam provisions incorporates the bad faith 
element into the in rem claim as well. See Broadbridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 
106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that bad faith is an element of ACPA 
in rem claims); Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110 F. Supp. 2d 420, 425 
(E.D. Va. 2000) (following Broadbridge Media); Hartog & Co. AS v. Swix.com, 136 F. 
Supp. 2d 531, 539 (E.D. Va. 2001) (following Harrods). The Fourth Circuit, however, 
disagrees. See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 2002 WL 141428, at *12 
(4th Cir. 2002) (holding that the ACPA’s “in rem provision not only covers bad faith 
claims under § 1125(d)(1), but also covers infringement claims under § 1114 and § 
1125(a) and dilution claims under § 1125(c)”). 
 48. For a detailed argument that the evidence relevant to bad faith under the ACPA 
may also help to establish minimum contacts, see Andrew J. Grotto, Due Process and In 
Rem Jurisdiction Under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 2 COLUM. 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 29-45 (2001). Cf. Sherry, supra note 4, at 337 (observing that 
“courts confronted with bad-faith registration of domain names” have “found ways to 
conclude that the defendant had targeted the forum state”). 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i). 
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V). 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI). 
 52. Foreign holders of U.S. trademarks can also sue under the ACPA, but a foreign 
plaintiff presumably would have to show effects on U.S. commerce in order to state a 
claim. Cf. Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 249 n.5 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that the Lanham Act reaches extraterritorial conduct “which has a significant 
effect on United States Commerce”). 
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thus creating contacts for jurisdictional purposes.53 Moreover, a regis-
trant’s choice of a .com domain name, rather than a domain name based on 
a country-code TLD, may sometimes suggest an intent to target U.S. mar-
kets.54 
It should be noted, however, that in five of the six cases to address the 
question to date55 the court has held that a foreign defendant’s registration 
of a domain name with a U.S. dealer did not create minimum contacts so 
as to confer in personam jurisdiction on a federal court in the district 
where the dealer is located. One early decision under the ACPA did indi-
cate, without discussion, that a registrant’s action in registering the perti-
nent domain name with NSI, a Virginia corporation, sufficed “to satisfy 
due process” for purposes of in personam jurisdiction.56 However, the five 
subsequent decisions have held to the contrary.57 The courts that found a 
due process violation reasoned that “the utility of a domain name depends 
in part on the registrar’s meeting its obligations, and in part on the opera-
tion of the [domain name system], only a small portion of which falls 
                                                                                                                        
 53. See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(finding minimum contacts with California, under Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), 
because defendant knew that the scheme of registering plaintiff’s trademarks as domain 
names would have “the effect of injuring [plaintiff] in California where [plaintiff] has its 
principal place of business and where the movie and television industry is centered”). 
 54. See, e.g., Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Int’l Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1111-12 
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that New Zealand defendants targeted the United States when, 
instead of choosing a .nz domain name, they registered a .com domain name with a U.S.-
based dealer; defendants “admitted that they sought out a specific domain name to target 
the ‘lucrative American market’”). 
 55. The issue has been addressed in six published opinions, by three district judges 
and one magistrate judge, in the Eastern District of Virginia. See infra notes 56-57; see 
also Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 2002 WL 141442, at *3-*4, *8 (4th Cir. 
2002) (implicitly assuming that the federal district court in Eastern District of Virginia 
lacked personal jurisdiction over registrant); Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain 
Names, 2002 WL 141428, at *3 (4th Cir. 2002) (reviewing judgment rendered by federal 
district court in Eastern District of Virginia, and noting without criticism the district 
court’s conclusion  that it lacked personal jurisdiction  over registrant). 
 56. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 531 n.5 (E.D. 
Va. 2000). 
 57. See Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 857 (E.D. Va. 2000) (hold-
ing that domain name registration agreements did not “create a sufficient relationship 
between [the registrant] and Virginia to satisfy due process”); Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. 
Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860, 865 (E.D. Va. 2000) (following America 
Online); Banco Inverlat, S.A. v. www.inverlat.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 521, 522 n.1 (E.D. 
Va. 2000) (following Heathmount); Hartog & Co. AS v. swix.com, 136 F. Supp. 2d 531, 
536 n.5 (E.D. Va. 2001) (following Heathmount); Cable News Network L.P. v. 




within the domain name registrar’s control.”58 Moreover, the typical do-
main name registration transaction is brief, is conducted over the Internet, 
involves no negotiation of terms, and does not require the dealer to per-
form “substantial services” in its home state.59 
Whether or not the use of a U.S.-based d aler creates minimum con-
tacts, it seems clear that the involvement of a U.S.-based dministrator, 
without more, should not create the requisite contacts.60 Registrants typi-
cally have no direct interaction with the administrator. Thus, a French reg-
istrant might use a dealer based in France to register a .com domain name, 
unaware that the administrator that will record the domain name is located 
in the United States. Unless other factors indicate that the registrant aimed 
its acts at the United States, such a registrant lacks sufficient contacts with 
the forum to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over the registrant. 
In any event, even if minimum contacts exist, a defendant can secure 
dismissal if it can show that the exercise of jurisdiction would nonetheless 
be unreasonable,61 based on a five-factor test. The test considers the bur-
den on the defendant, the forum’s interest in hearing the dispute, the plain-
tiff’s interest in obtaining relief, the international judicial system’s interest 
in the efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interests of vari-
ous nations in furthering substantive social policies.62 Admittedly, the 
                                                                                                                        
 58. Am. Online, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 853. 
 59. Id. at 855 n.21; Heathmount, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 866-67. 
  The courts that found a due process violation generally appeared to assume that 
the minimum contacts analysis should look to the registrant’s contacts with a particular 
state, rather than aggregating all of the registrant’s contacts with the United States. As 
noted above, that assumption is open to question. See supra note 40. The courts’ preoc-
cupation with assessing the registrant’s contacts with the state of Virginia, rather than 
with the United States as a whole, may have altered some factors in the analysis. Thus, 
for instance, while it may be true that the registrant of a .com domain name would be 
unaware that NSI is located in Virginia, see Heathmount, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 866 & n.7, it 
is far less plausible that such a registrant would be unaware that it was dealing with a 
U.S. dealer. On the whole, however, it does not appear that nationwide aggregation of 
contacts would have altered these courts' conclusions that registration with a U.S. dealer 
is insufficient to create minimum contacts. 
 60. The fact that no published opinion to date addresses the latter question suggests 
that potential plaintiffs agree with this assessment. 
 61. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (indicating that 
defendant has burden of demonstrating unreasonableness). 
 62. When the Court enunciated these five factors in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980), and applied them in Burger King, 471 U.S. at 
476-77, 482-84, it was evaluating state courts’ assertions of jurisdiction over defendants 
located outside the forum state but within the United States. Accordingly, the Court de-
scribed the last two factors in terms applicable to interstate, rather than international, dis-
putes: “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution 
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burden on a foreign defendant of litigating an ACPA claim in the United 
States will be considerable.63 In addition, the policies of other nations with 
respect to the regulation of trademarks, and domain names in particular, 
may differ substantially from those of the United States, and a United 
States court’s adjudication of an ACPA claim may contravene such poli-
cies.64 Balanced against the burden on the defendant and the effect on 
other countries’ trademark policies, however, are the United States’ inter-
est in adjudicating the dispute and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining ef-
fective relief.65 The ACPA grew out of congressional concern that U.S. 
businesses lacked recourse against cybersquatters, including foreign cy-
bersquatters.66 Its remedies are presumably available only to holders of a 
mark protected under United States law; and though neither the plaintiff 
nor the defendant need be a U.S. citizen, the ACPA applies only in cases 
where the bad-faith registration has a significant effect on U.S. com-
                                                                                                                        
of controversies” and “the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. The Court has 
since noted that the application of these two factors to the assertion of jurisdiction over a 
foreign defendant “calls for a court to consider the procedural and substantive policies of 
other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction.” Asahi Metal 
Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (holding California state court’s as-
sertion of jurisdiction over Japanese defendant unreasonable under the circumstances). 
 63. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (“The unique burdens placed upon one who must 
defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the 
reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national bor-
ders.”). 
 64. On the other hand, Asahi’s treatment of the reasonableness factors also suggests 
that the social policies of other nations may weigh more heavily in the defendant’s favor 
when a state court asserts jurisdiction than when a federal court asserts jurisdiction under 
a federal statute. The Asahi Court noted that a state court’s assertion of jurisdiction over 
an alien defendant must be assessed in light of the federal government’s interest in guid-
ing foreign relations. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115. Where Congress has enacted legislation 
authorizing suit against a foreign cybersquatter, a federal court’s assertion of jurisdiction 
may be less open to question because the concern of state interference with federal for-
eign policy does not arise. 
 65. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (“When minimum contacts have been established, 
often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify 
even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.”). It could also be argued that the 
fifth factor—the international interest in efficient dispute resolution—favors the plaintiff, 
because an ACPA suit provides a means to determine the rights of each party in the rele-
vant domain name. 
 66. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14 (1999) (noting the need to address situations 




merce.67 Accordingly, the reasonableness analysis may on balance favor 
the exercise of jurisdiction. 
3. Constitutionality of in rem jurisdiction 
As we have seen, the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over ACPA 
claims against foreign registrants will sometimes be constitutional, but in 
other cases it will violate due process. In the latter instances, 
§ 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) purports to make in rem jurisdiction available. Con-
trary to the apparent expectations of the ACPA’s drafters, however, due 
process requires that there be “minimum contacts” between the registrant 
and the forum, no matter whether the ACPA claims are denominated in 
personam or in rem.68 In cases where the assertion of in personam juris-
diction would violate due process, the assertion of in rem jurisdiction 
would likewise be unconstitutional.69 
The drafters of the ACPA apparently assumed that a foreign registrant 
who registered a domain name in bad faith70 would lack contacts sufficient 
to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction,71 but that the in rem provi-
sion would help to fill this gap. The ACPA’s drafters predicted that in 
rem suits would not offend due process, “since the property and only the 
property is the subject of the jurisdiction, not other substantive personal 
rights of any individual defendant.”72 In keeping with this view, a number 
                                                                                                                        
 67. Cases under other provisions of the Lanham Act indicate that a major factor in 
determining the Lanham Act’s reach is whether the defendant’s alleged conduct had a 
significant effect on U.S. commerce. See, e.g., Buti v. Perosa, 139 F.3d 98, 104 n.2, 105 
(2d Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of foreign defendant’s Lanham Act counterclaim be-
cause defendant failed to use its mark in commerce in the United States and the mark was 
not a famous mark); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 249 n.5 (4th 
Cir. 1994) (holding that the Lanham Act reaches extraterritorial conduct “which has a 
significant effect on United States Commerce”). 
 68. See infra text accompanying notes 74-93. 
 69. See infra text accompanying notes 94-97. 
 70. The ACPA also prohibits bad-faith trafficking in or use of domain names. Se  
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). For purposes of simplicity, however, we focus on bad-faith 
registration. The jurisdictional issues raised in suits alleging trafficking or use would be 
similar to those in cases of bad-faith registration; if anything, the case for jurisdiction 
might be stronger in trafficking or use cases, to the extent that such activities provided 
additional contacts between the defendant and the United States. 
 71. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14 (1999) (stating that “personal jurisdiction 
cannot be established over the domain name registrant” when the registrant is not a U.S. 
resident). 
 72. H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14. Damages are not available in ACPA in rem ac-
tions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i) (“The remedies in an in rem action under this 
paragraph shall be limited to a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain 
name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark.”). 
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of the courts that have applied the ACPA have accepted the notion that in 
rem jurisdiction is available despite the absence of minimum contacts for 
in personam purposes.73 Such a conclusion, however, contravenes the Su-
preme Court’s statement in Shaffer v. Heitner74 that all assertions of juris-
diction,75 whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem, must meet the 
minimum contacts requirements developed in International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington76 and its progeny.77 
Shaffer involved attachment jurisdiction, also known as quasi in 
rem Type 2 jurisdiction, but the Shaffer Court made clear that the princi-
ples it set forth also apply to in rem and quasi in rem Type 1 jurisdiction. 
In Shaffer, the plaintiff brought a shareholders’ derivative suit in Delaware 
state court against officers and directors of a Delaware corporation,78 
based on the attachment, pursuant to a Delaware statute, of corporate stock 
and options owned by the individual defendants.79 The plaintiff alleged 
that the individual defendants had breached their duties to the corporation 
by causing the corporation and a subsidiary to engage in activities in Ore-
gon that led to a civil damages award and a large criminal contempt fine.80
                                                                                                                        
 73. See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 2002 WL 141428, at *3, *6 
(4th Cir. 2002) (assuming that in personam jurisdiction was unavailable over registrant in 
Eastern District of Virginia, and holding nonetheless that “courts in Virginia, the state 
where the Domain Names are registered, may constitutionally exercise in rem jurisdiction 
over them”); Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 2002 WL 141442, at *8-*9 (4th 
Cir. 2002) (assuming that the district court in Eastern District of Virginia lacked in per-
sonam jurisdiction over registrant, but holding that the district court had in rem jurisdic-
tion over domain names); Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 
860, 867-68 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding insufficient contacts for the exercise of in per-
sonam jurisdiction, but allowing quasi in rem claim to proceed); Banco Inverlat, S.A. v. 
www.inverlat.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 521, 522 n.1 (E.D. Va. 2000) (same); Hartog & Co. 
AS v. swix.com, 136 F. Supp. 2d 531, 536 & n.5 (E.D. Va. 2001) (same); Cable News 
Network L.P. v. CNNnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Va. 2001), (same). 
 74. 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). 
 75. The statement in Shaffer pertained to “assertions of state-court jurisdiction,” 433 
U.S. at 212, but the Court’s reasoning is equally applicable to the exercise of jurisdiction 
by federal courts. See infra text accompanying notes 122-123. 
 76. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 77. The argument that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 
U.S. 604 (1990), limits Shaffer’s statement concerning minimum contacts, is addressed 
below. See infra notes 110-114 and accompanying text. 
 78. The suit named as defendants Greyhound Corp., Greyhound’s wholly owned 
subsidiary Greyhound Lines, Inc., and twenty-eight current or former officers or directors 
of one or both entities. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189-90. 
 79. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 190-94. Under a Delaware statute, the stock of a Delaware 
corporation was deemed to be located within the state for purposes of attachment. Id. at 
192 n.9. 
 80. Id. at 190. 
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The Delaware courts denied the defendants’ jurisdictional challenge, rea-
soning that quasi in rem jurisdiction, which traditionally was based on at-
tachment of property within the jurisdiction, did not require that the de-
fendants have contacts with the forum.81 The Supreme Court, however, 
reversed, rejecting both the jurisdictional conclusion and its premise. Not-
ing that under International Shoe, “the relationship among the defendant, 
the forum, and the litigation” had become “the central concern of the in-
quiry into personal jurisdiction,”82 the Court proceeded to consider 
whether the International Shoe standard “should be held to govern actions 
in rem as well as in personam.”83 Because “judicial jurisdiction over a 
thing” (the traditional conception of in rem jurisdiction) is merely “a cus-
tomary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of per-
sons in a thing,”84 the Court concluded that “in order to justify an exercise 
of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to jus-
tify” in personam jurisdiction—i.e., it must meet “the minimum-contacts 
standard elucidated in International Shoe.”85 The Court made clear that 
this standard applied to all assertions of in rem jurisdiction, not just to the 
type of quasi in rem jurisdiction that was at issue in Shaffer itself:  the 
Court stated flatly that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be 
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its 
progeny,” and it added that “[t]o the extent that prior decisions are incon-
sistent with this standard, they are overruled.”86 
Consistent with its stated intention to set a standard for application to 
all in rem cases, the Court took pains to assess the likely effect of its new 
approach on different types of in rem jurisdiction.87 Under International 
Shoe, although the mere fact that property is present within the forum will 
not in itself justify jurisdiction, that fact is nevertheless relevant, for it can 
help to provide the requisite minimum contacts between the defendant and 
                                                                                                                        
 81. Id. at 196. 
 82. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204. 
 83. Id. at 206. 
 84. Id. at 207 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56, Intro-
ductory Note (1971)). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 212 & n.39. 
 87. Justice Powell’s concurrence in Shaffer provides a further indication of the 
scope of the majority opinion. Justice Powell wrote separately to express the following 
caveat: “I would explicitly reserve judgment . . . on whether the ownership of some forms 
of property whose situs is indisputably and permanently located within a State may, with-
out more, provide the contacts necessary to subject a defendant to jurisdiction within the 
State to the extent of the value of the property.” Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., 
concurring). The fact that Justice Powell felt it necessary to state this reservation suggests 
that he viewed the Court’s opinion as having a potentially broad sweep. 
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the forum. As the Court put it, “when claims to the property itself are the 
source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to 
have jurisdiction,” since “the defendant’s claim to property located in the 
State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit from the State’s 
protection of his interest.”88 Moreover, in such cases the forum will often 
have “strong interests in assuring the marketability of property within its 
borders and in providing a procedure for peaceful resolution of disputes 
about the possession of that property,” and relevant evidence and wit-
nesses will often be found within the forum89—factors which would sup-
port the argument that the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable. 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that its extension of the Int rnational 
Shoe standard to all assertions of state-court jurisdiction was unlikely to 
affect jurisdiction over most in rem actions other than those in which the 
property attached was unrelated to the claim.90 
The Court recognized, however, that in quasi in rem Type 2 cases such 
as Shaffer itself, the imposition of the International Shoe standard would 
“result in significant change,” because the defendant’s ownership of prop-
erty within the forum would be unrelated to the plaintiff’s cause of ac-
tion.91 Where the cause of action does not relate to, or arise out of, the de-
fendant’s contacts with the forum, those contacts will not meet the In er-
national Shoe standard unless they are continuous and systematic—a test 
that will not be met by the mere ownership of property within the forum.92 
In Shaffer, the Court concluded that neither the defendants’ ownership of 
stock in the Delaware corporation nor their positions as officers or direc-
tors of that corporation provided the requisite minimum contacts for pur-
poses of the shareholders’ derivative suit. Accordingly, it held that the 
Delaware courts’ assertion of jurisdiction violated due process.93  
Although it might at first seem that the ACPA’s in rem provisions sat-
isfy the minimum contacts analysis sketched out in Shaffer, such an argu-
ment does not withstand scrutiny. The argument is that a plaintiff can 
bring an ACPA in rem suit only when the domain name was registered by 
a U.S. dealer or administrator, that in such instances, the ACPA deems the 
                                                                                                                        
 88. Id. at 207-08. 
 89. Id. at 208. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Continuous and systematic contacts with the forum have been held sufficient for 
the exercise of jurisdiction over an unrelated claim against a corporation. See Perkins v. 
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952). 
 93. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 213-17. 
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domain name to be property located within the United States, and that the 
plaintiff’s claim thus arises directly out of a claim to the registrant’s prop-
erty located within the forum. However, as the Shaffer Court noted, even 
in cases where the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of, or relates to, the 
defendant’s claim of ownership of the pertinent property, the presence of 
that property within the forum will not always support the inference of 
contacts between the defendant and the forum.94 
The Shaffer Court’s caveat foreshadows the issues raised by the 
ACPA. The ACPA’s in rem provision authorizes suits against domain 
names registered with a U.S. dealer or administrator.95 Assuming that 
Congress has the authority to designate domain names as a form of prop-
erty that can be subjected to attachment for purposes of in rem jurisdic-
tion,96 and assuming further that Congress has the authority to provide that 
such domain names are located within the United States whenever the 
dealer or administrator involved in registering the domain name is located 
within the United States, the resulting “presence” of the domain name 
within the United States does not, without more, provide minimum con-
tacts between the registrant and the United States.97 If, for example, the 
registrant registered the domain name with a foreign dealer and had no 
idea that the domain name would be administered by a registry based in 
the United States, the “presence” of the domain name within the United 
States would not indicate the existence of minimum contacts between the 
registrant and the United States. In sum, the “presence” of the domain 
name within the United States adds nothing to the minimum contacts 
analysis; either the registrant has minimum contacts so as to satisfy due 
                                                                                                                        
 94. The Court suggested that such an inference might be unfounded, for example, in 
cases where a chattel was brought into the forum without the owner’s consent or where 
the plaintiff’s fraud induced the owner to send the chattel into the forum. See Shaffer, 433 
U.S. at 208 n.25 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 60 cmts. c & 
d). 
 95. Such suits are to be brought “in the judicial district in which the domain name 
registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority that registered or as-
signed the domain name is located.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A). 
 96.  See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 2002 WL 141442, at *9 (4th Cir. 
2002) (“Congress may treat a domain name registration if it chooses, without violating 
the constitution”). 
 97. Cf. Fleetboston Fin. Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 
135 (D. Mass. 2001) (refusing to interpret the ACPA as permitting suit in any district 
where documents establishing control of the domain name are deposited with the court, 
because “a statute that creates a res out of an intangible bundle of rights, and then gives 
to any plaintiff with a colorable claim the right to transfer that res to the forum of its 
choice, anywhere in the nation, offends notions of fair play”). 
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process, or else the International Shoe standard will bar the exercise of 
any type of jurisdiction, either in rem or in personam.98 
Under Shaffer, then, the ACPA in rem provision is of use only in cases 
involving anonymous registrants; in cases where, instead, the registrant is 
known but cannot be subjected to an in personam ACPA claim, the regis-
trant’s lack of minimum contacts with the United States will similarly bar 
the assertion of in rem jurisdiction. Two district courts in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia have resisted this conclusion, arguing that Shaffer does 
not require the application of minimum contacts analysis to ACPA in rem 
actions.99 For example, the court in Cable News Network L.P. v. 
Cnnews.com (“CNN”) held that “in an ACPA in rem action, it is not nec-
essary that the allegedly infringing registrant have minimum contacts with 
the forum.”100 The arguments advanced to support this assertion fall into 
three general categories:  (1) that Shaffer’s requirement of minimum con-
tacts is dictum as applied to the in rem cause of action created by the 
ACPA and can thus be disregarded;101 (2) that Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Burnham v. Superior Court102 somehow overruled Shaffer’s requirement 
                                                                                                                        
 98. Shaffer also forecloses the argument that the limited nature of the remedies 
available through an in rem suit loosens the requirements of due process. See, e.g., Am. 
Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 858 n.32 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that regis-
tration of a domain name did not create contacts sufficient to justify in personam jurisdic-
tion, and distinguishing a quasi in rem ACPA case on the ground that “the registrant’s 
contact with [the registrar] satisfied due process” in light of “the limited relief available 
under the in rem proceeding, namely forfeiture of the domain name in question”). While 
the Shaffer Court recognized that “the potential liability of a defendant in an in rem ac-
tion is limited by the value of the property,” it found this fact irrelevant to the due process 
analysis because the fairness of subjecting the defendant to jurisdiction “does not depend 
on the size of the claim being litigated.” Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207 n.23. 
 99. See Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. 
Va. 2001) (holding that because ACPA actions are “properly categorized as 'true in rem,' 
there is no requirement that the owner or claimant of the res have minimum contacts with 
the forum”); Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (E.D. 
Va. 2000) (holding that in ACPA actions “it is unnecessary for minimum contacts to 
meet personal jurisdiction standards” because “under Shaffer, there must be minimum 
contacts to support personal jurisdiction only in those in rem proceedings where the un-
derlying cause of action is unrelated to the property which is located in the forum state”). 
The drafters of the ACPA also appear to have relied on this contention See H.R. CONF. 
REP. NO. 106-464, at 114 (1999) (quoting a district court’s statement that “[i]n a true in 
rem proceeding . . . due process requires only that the property itself have certain mini-
mum contacts with the territory of the forum”). 
 100. Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Va. 
2001). 
 101. See id. 
 102. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
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of minimum contacts for in rem actions;103 and (3) that other authorities 
provide some basis for a refusal to apply the minimum contacts test to 
ACPA in rem claims.104 However, each of these arguments fails. 
As demonstrated above, the Shaffer Court clearly intended to extend 
the International Shoe framework to all cases of in rem jurisdiction; and 
whether that extension was dictum or holding, it should be applied to the 
in rem provisions of the ACPA.105 Notably, the Shaffer Court itself char-
acterized as a “holding” its conclusion “that any assertion of state-court 
jurisdiction must satisfy the International Shoe standard.”106 Moreover, 
Shaffer’s core principle—that jurisdiction over a thing is merely another 
way of describing jurisdiction over the interests of persons in that thing—
applies with equal force to all in rem cases, irrespective of whether the 
cause of action is related to the property that forms the basis for jurisdic-
tion. Indeed, recognizing this, the majority in Shaffer analyzed the prob-
able effects of the holding on cases in which “claims to the property itself 
are the source of the underlying controversy.”107 Even if Shaffer’s state-
ment is dictum as it applies to in rem and quasi in rem Type 1 cases,108 it 
                                                                                                                        
 103. See Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 491 nn.19 & 20. 
 104. See id. at 491 n.19 and accompanying text. 
 105. See Fleetboston Fin. Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 
134 (D. Mass. 2001) (“The logic of Shaffer’s limitations would appear to extend to ac-
tions in which the existence of the property in the state cannot fairly be said to represent 
meaningful contacts between the forum state, the defendant, and the litigation. While this 
will generally be type II quasi in rem actions, it will not be so exclusively”); Paul Schiff 
Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction: Cyberspace, Nation-States, and Community 
Definition, 151 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at *, on file with authors) 
(noting that although “[s]ome courts read Shaffer narrowly,” dicta in the Shaffer majority 
opinion suggest “that the . . . Court intended its holding to extend . . . to all in rem juris-
diction,” so that “Shaffer may be taken to stand for the proposition that Congress cannot 
avoid the Constitutional requirements of fair play and substantial justice simply by call-
ing an action in rem, and by limiting recovery to the res itself”). 
 106. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977) (“It appears . . . that jurisdiction 
over many types of actions which now are or might be brought in rem would not be af-
fected by a holding that any assertion of state-court jurisdiction must satisfy the Interna-
tional Shoe standard.”). 
 107. Id. at 207. Although the Court then proceeded to focus on the application of the 
minimum contacts test to the assertion of quasi in rem Type 2 jurisdiction, that focus 
arose not only from the fact that Shaffer itself involved quasi in rem Type 2 jurisdiction, 
but also from the Court’s belief that “acceptance of the Int rnational Shoe test would 
most affect this class of cases.” Id. at 209. 
 108. It is not self-evident that the statements concerning these types of in rem juris-
diction should be viewed as dictum. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1997, 2040 (1994) (arguing that the distinction between holding and dictum 




is carefully considered dictum. When the Supreme Court articulates a gen-
eral principle of constitutional doctrine, and especially when the Court 
takes pains, as it did in Shaffer, to assess the implications of that principle 
for contexts other than that of the case at hand, lower courts should be 
slow to brush the principle aside as mere “dictum.”109 
The CNN court acknowledged that “there is language in Shaffer that 
could be read to require that ll in rem cases conform to the same due 
process constraints as in personam cases,” but asserted that “the greater 
weight of (and more persuasive) authority holds that the language of 
Shaffer requires minimum contacts only for quasi in rem II-type cases.”110 
The authorities referred to, however, are either inapposite or erroneous. 
For example, the court cites Justice Scalia’s opinion in Burnham, a case in 
which the Court upheld a state court’s assertion of in personam jurisdic-
tion over a defendant who was personally served with process while 
physically present in the forum state.111 In the portion of the Burnham 
opinion cited by the CNN court, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice 
                                                                                                                        
 109. It is a truism that dictum does not constitute binding precedent. As Chief Justice 
Marshall stated, “general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection 
with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may 
be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very 
point is presented for decision.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821). Nonethe-
less, the lower federal courts customarily accord substantial weight to Supreme Court 
dictum that was carefully considered by the Court. See, e.g., Guidry v. Sheet Metal Wkrs. 
Int’l Assoc., Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 706 n.3 (10th Cir. 1993) (“If [Supreme Court] 
dicta had clearly resolved the issue in this appeal we would be bound by that decision.”); 
McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[F]ederal appellate 
courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as firmly as by the 
Court’s outright holdings, particularly when . . . a dictum is of recent vintage and not 
enfeebled by any subsequent statement.”); Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 889 F.2d 
115, 120 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the Court of Appeals “should respect considered 
Supreme Court dicta”); United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 486 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(en banc) (“The Supreme Court cannot limit its constitutional adjudication to the narrow 
facts before it in a particular case. In the decision of individual cases the Court must and 
regularly does establish guidelines to govern a variety of situations related to that pre-
sented in the immediate case. The system could not function if lower courts were free to 
disregard such guidelines whenever they did not precisely match the facts of the case in 
which the guidelines were announced.”); Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 707 (6th Cir. 
1974) (“Even the Court’s dicta is [sic] of persuasive precedential value.”); Fouts v. Md. 
Cas. Co., 30 F.2d 357, 359 (4th Cir. 1929) (“[D]icta of the United States Supreme Court 
should be very persuasive.”); cf. United States v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(stating that “considered or ‘judicial dictum’ where the Court . . . is providing a construc-
tion of a statute to guide the future conduct of inferior courts,” though not binding, “must 
be given considerable weight”). 
 110. Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 490-91. 
111.  See Burnham, 495 U.S. 604 (1990)  
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Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, argued that the International Shoe mini-
mum contacts analysis need not be applied to the Burnham defendant, and 
distinguished Shaffer on the basis that it involved an “absent defendant,” 
rather than one who is physically present within the forum state at the time 
of service of process. “The logic of Shaffer’s holding—which places all 
suits against absent nonresidents on the same constitutional footing, re-
gardless of whether a separate Latin label is attached to one particular ba-
sis of contact—does not compel the conclusion that physically present de-
fendants must be treated identically to absent ones.”112 Notably, Justice 
Scalia’s description of Shaffer’s “logic” actually supports Shaffer’s appli-
cation to “all suits against absent defendants”—including ACPA in rem 
actions.113 
It is true that Justice Scalia also argued that the result in Bur ham 
should turn on the historical pedigree of “tag” jurisdiction, and that this 
reliance on tradition contradicts the Court’s approach in Shaffer, which 
applied minimum contacts analysis to in rem jurisdiction despite its “an-
cient form.”114 Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Burnham, however, would not 
validate the use of the ACPA’s in rem procedure, because as he acknowl-
edged, “[f]or new procedures, hitherto unknown,” the due process inquiry 
is guided by International Shoe.115 Although in rem jurisdiction has a long 
historical pedigree, the same cannot be said of the application of in rem 
jurisdiction to Internet domain names. Rather, the ACPA’s attempt to use 
domain names and Internet contacts as a basis for jurisdiction is an indis-
putably modern construct. Justice Scalia’s appeal to tradition in Bur ham 
thus provides no support for the constitutionality of the ACPA’s in rem 
provisions. In any event, no part of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Burnham 
gained the votes of a majority of the Justices. 
Of the other authorities cited by the CNN court, the only sources that 
directly support CNN’s holding116 are one district court case and one law 
                                                                                                                        
 112. Id. at 621. 
 113. ACPA in rem suits involve “absent defendants,” because in all such suits—other 
than cases involving anonymous registrants—the registrant will be located outside the 
forum. Accordingly, Justice Scalia’s discussion in Burnham, which turned on the pres-
ence of the defendant within the forum state, is by its own terms inapposite. 
 114. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, 
J.). 
 115. Id. 
 116. The CNN court cites four other authorities which are inapposite. 
  In Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 
605 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1979), the court upheld the assertion of quasi in rem Type 1 juris-
diction because the attached funds were payments that the plaintiff had made to the de-
fendant with respect to the contract at issue in the case, and the payments were in the 
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review article.117 In Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-palace.com,118 the 
court rejected the argument that the minimum contacts requirement ap-
plies to the assertion of in rem jurisdiction under the ACPA, reasoning that 
Shaffer is limited to cases in which the cause of action “is unrelated to the 
property which is located in the forum state.”119 This argument, which is 
merely a restatement of the “Shaffer as dictum” argument, fails for the 
                                                                                                                        
relevant New York bank account pursuant to the contract. See id. at 655. The court also 
noted that the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity supported the exercise of jurisdiction 
because there was no indication that the defendant would be amenable to suit anywhere 
else in the world. See id. at 655. Finally, the court reasoned that “jurisdiction by attach-
ment of property should be accorded special deference in the admiralty context.” Id. 
  In Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1980), a case in-
volving in personam jurisdiction, the court held that Shaffer did not undermine the hold-
ing of Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). In Perkins, the 
Court had held that a corporation that carries on continuous and systematic activities 
within a state can be sued in the courts of that state on a claim unrelated to the corpora-
tion’s in-state activities. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48. Far from being at odds with the 
International Shoe minimum contacts requirement, Perkins articulates the nature of that 
requirement in cases of general jurisdiction. Shaffer’s statement that the International 
Shoe analysis governs all state court assertions of jurisdiction does not undermine Per-
kins. Thus, the court’s statement in Schreiber that “Shaffer is distinguishable,” Schreiber, 
611 F.2d at 793, is both correct and utterly irrelevant to the question presented by the 
ACPA. 
  In John N. John, Jr., Inc. v. Brahma Petroleum Corp., 699 F. Supp. 2d 1220 
(W.D. La. 1988), the court found Shaffer inapposite because “the property attached is the 
very subject of the cause of action. Id at 1222. Since the property in question was tangi-
ble and the plaintiff shipped it into the jurisdiction on the defendant's behalf, see id. at 
1220, the property’s presence within the forum might well be seen to provide contacts 
between the defendant and the forum. Moreover, the court found that “sufficient con-
tacts” existed because the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the state, by contracting to do business within the state. Id. t 
1222. 
  Finally, the CNN court cites a law review article that does not support the 
court’s argument. See Walter W. Heiser, A “Minimum Interest” Approach to Personal 
Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 967-68 (2000) (noting that “in Shaffer, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the minimum contacts standard was applicable to all asser-
tions of jurisdiction,” and proposing a “minimum interests test” that “would produce the 
same due process results in property-based actions as those identified by the Shaffer 
Court”). 
 117. See Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502 (E.D. Va. 
2000); Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97, 137-40 
(2000). 
 118. 112 F. Supp. 2d 502 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
 119. Id. at 504. Despite its assertion that “it is unnecessary for minimum contacts to 
meet personal jurisdiction standards,” the Caesars World court proceeded to address the 
question of minimum contacts, and concluded that “the fact of domain name registration 
with Network Solutions, Inc., in Virginia supplies” such contacts. Id. 
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reasons discussed above. The law review article, likewise, relies mainly on 
the contention that Justice Scalia’s Burnham opinion weakens the force of 
Shaffer120—an assertion which is unpersuasive for the above reasons.121 
There remain two possible arguments not yet advanced by the courts 
that have rejected Shaffer’s application to ACPA cases:  first, that Shaffer 
by its terms applies only to assertions of jurisdiction by state, not federal 
courts, and second, that even if Shaffer ordinarily would require minimum 
contacts for ACPA in rem suits, such suits should be allowed to proceed 
under the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity.122 Neither argument, how-
ever, is likely to succeed. 
Admittedly, the limitations imposed by the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment on the exercise of territorial jurisdiction by federal 
courts differ in some respects from the limitations imposed on state courts 
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For in-
stance, it appears likely that the Fifth Amendment due process analysis 
can in appropriate cases look to an absent defendant’s contacts with the 
United States as a whole, rather than just to the defendant's contacts with 
the state in which the federal court sits.123 However, in other respects the 
doctrines of federal-court territorial jurisdiction draw heavily upon the due 
process analysis developed under the Fourteenth Amendment;124 and 
though the Shaffer Court referred only to state-court jurisdiction, the logic 
of the opinion supports a similar analysis with respect to federal-court ju-
risdiction as well. Accordingly, Shaffer’s requirement that the defendant 
have minimum contacts with the forum should apply equally to federal 
court assertions of in rem jurisdiction under the ACPA, although the 
minimum contacts analysis would focus on the registrant’s contacts with 
the United States as a whole. 
The doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity also does not validate the 
ACPA’s in rem provision. That doctrine has been argued to support a 
                                                                                                                        
 120. See Lee, supra note 117, 137-40. Lee also seems to suggest that Shaffer itself 
does not require minimum contacts analysis in in rem or quasi in rem Type 1 proceed-
ings, and he asserts that in any event the registration of a domain name with NSI in Hern-
don, Virginia provides the requisite minimum contacts for an ACPA suit. See id. at 141-
43. 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 111-115. 
 122. See Fanning, supra note 44, at 1923-26 (discussing application to ACPA of doc-
trine of jurisdiction by necessity); see also Grotto, supra note 48, at 26-28. 
 123. See supra note 40. 
 124. For example, courts analyzing the scope of federal-court in personam jurisdic-
tion under the Fifth Amendment due process clause use the International Shoe minimum 




court’s exercise of jurisdiction over defendants, despite the defendants’ 
lack of minimum contacts with the forum, if no other court would have 
territorial jurisdiction over the defendants.125 For example, the Court in 
Shaffer noted, but did not consider, “the question whether the presence of 
a defendant’s property in a State is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when 
no other forum is available to the plaintiff.”126 The Court subsequently in-
dicated, however, that such a theory is unavailable in cases where the de-
fendant is subject to suit in a foreign court.127 The courts of the country 
where a domain name registrant is located presumably will have territorial 
jurisdiction over claims against that registrant.128 Moreover, domain name 
registrants are subject to nonjudicial proceedings under ICANN’s Uniform 
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, and those proceedings provide a 
successful claimant the same remedies as the ACPA’s in rem provi-
                                                                                                                        
 125. Commentators have argued that Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306 (1950), provides support for the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity. In 
Mullane, the Supreme Court held that the New York state courts had power “to determine 
the interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident,” in a trust created under New York 
law. Id. at 313. The Court emphasized “the interest of each state in providing means to 
close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision 
of its courts.” Id. Commentators have adduced this reasoning as support for the argument 
that “defendants who do not have contacts with the state [should] be subject to the juris-
diction of the state for purposes of settling their claims” in cases involving absent trust 
beneficiaries or claimants to land located within the state. LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. 
WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 278-79 (2d ed. 2000). However, such considerations do not 
justify the assertion of jurisdiction by necessity in litigation under the ACPA. Although 
the U.S. played a dominant role in the formation of the Internet, domain names are not 
creatures of United States law in the way that the trust in Mullane was a creature of New 
York state law. Nor does the federal government supervise the administration of the do-
main name system, as the New York courts supervised the administration of New York 
trusts: rather, the administration of the domain name system is currently supervised by 
ICANN. Moreover, as noted in the text, ICANN has its own mechanism for resolving 
domain name disputes, so that an assertion of jurisdiction by U.S. courts probably would 
not be considered “necessary.” 
 126. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977). 
 127. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
jurisdiction by necessity argument on the ground that the plaintiffs “failed to carry their 
burden of showing that all three defendants could not be sued together in a single forum 
. . .  for example, . . .  in either Colombia or Peru.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13 (1984). 
 128. Admittedly, the fact that a foreign court would have territorial jurisdiction over 
the registrant does not necessarily mean that the foreign court would also have subject 
matter jurisdiction over an ACPA claim against that registrant, or that foreign law would 
provide any similar remedy. However, these questions are academic, because the avail-
ability of the UDRP procedures should remove any argument that jurisdiction by neces-
sity validates the ACPA’s in rem provisions. See infra note 129. 
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sions.129 Accordingly, the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity seems 
unlikely to validate those provisions. 
In sum, contacts between a registrant and the United States will suffice 
for in rem jurisdiction only if the contacts are extensive enough to support 
in personam jurisdiction as well. If the requisite minimum contacts exist, 
in personam jurisdiction will be available, and thus § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) 
will not apply. As a result, the only cases in which § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) 
provides a basis for in rem jurisdiction are those in which the exercise of 
jurisdiction would violate due process. Once the courts recognize this con-
stitutional problem, the ACPA’s in rem provision will be of no use to a 
mark owner seeking to sue a foreign domain name registrant who lacks 
minimum contacts with the United States. Indeed, the provision already is 
of little use, as most mark owners choose to proceed under the ICANN 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy instead of suing in fed-
eral court under the ACPA.130 Thus, the significance of the in rem provi-
sion lies mainly in Congress’ aggressive assertion of jurisdiction over do-
main name disputes involving foreign registrants, and in Congress’ at-
tempt to ground the exercise of jurisdiction in the purported “presence” of 
the domain name within the United States, which in turn depends on the 
location of the dealer or administrator within the United States. Similarly, 
as we discuss below, the strength of the United States' claim to prescrip-
tive jurisdiction over international domain name disputes depends largely 
on the present geographical location of the registry in charge of adminis-
tering the key top-level domains. But while the in rem provision’s use of 
dealer and administrator locations is of conceptual rather than practical 
interest, as the in rem provision is unconstitutional according to our analy-
sis, the significance of geography in the prescriptive jurisdiction analysis 
has real-world consequences. 
                                                                                                                        
 129. See ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, §§ 3(c), 4(i), at 
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited May 15, 2002) [hereinafter 
UDRP] (stating that the remedies available in UDRP proceeding are the cancellation or 
transfer of the domain name). Admittedly, there may be cases where a mark holder would 
not be able to proceed under the UDRP; while “[t]he ACPA applies to registration, traf-
ficking, or use of a domain name, . . . the UDRP requires both registration and use.” 
David E. Sorkin, Judicial Review of ICANN Domain Name Dispute Decisions, 18 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & H IGH TECH. L.J. 35, 50 (2001) (citing ICANN Uniform Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution Policy § 4(a)(iii)). It seems likely, however, that in most in-
stances a mark owner with an ACPA claim could also proceed under the UDRP. 
 130. See Sherry, supra note 4, at 355 (noting that the UDRP “is apparently much 
more popular with trademark owners than is the ACPA: there are only about forty re-
ported ACPA cases, but there have been over 4,000 arbitrations under the UDRP”). 
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III. NAMING JURISDICTION:  REALSPACE SOVEREIGNS & 
DOMAIN NAMES  
This Article now turns from the adjudicative to the legislative, and 
from the constitutional to the strategic. Part III considers the implications 
of the present far-reaching Congressional approach to legislative jurisdic-
tion over domain name disputes, noting that this U.S.-centric view in this 
new economic structure would not be in the long-term interests of either 
the global electronic commerce community as a whole, or the U.S. partici-
pants in particular.131 
A. Distributed Hierarchy:  The Control of Domain Names 
As presently constituted,132 the domain name system133 is nothing 
more (and nothing less) than a distributed hierarchical database—a simple 
list of names and their corresponding IP addresses.134 No single computer 
contains the entire database; the computers that do contain the database 
(called “DNS servers”) are located in myriad locations worldwide, both 
physically and logically. Yet the hierarchical nature of the system means 
                                                                                                                        
 131. See Sherry, supra note 4. Sherry argues that the ACPA is potentially ill-advised 
for several reasons: (1) the inherent confusion resulting from new statutory enactments, 
id. at 342-43; (2) possible First Amendment concerns as a result of confusion in im-
plementing the new provisions, id. at 343-48; (3) the ACPA’s limited utility in the face 
of changing technology, id. at 347-50; and (4) its limited utility in light of the expansion 
of the DNS namespace (by adding TLDs) and the dispute resolution provided by ICANN, 
id. at 354. While we generally agree with Sherry’s suggestion that the ACPA is troubling, 
only reason (4) describes a concern particular to the ACPA—as opposed to concerns 
about legislation more generally. In addition, the expansion of the DNS namespace is 
unlikely to diminish domain name disputes. Cf. id. Instead, the expansion of the name-
space may actually generate more disputes, because the truly scarce (and thus valuable) 
resource involved is web surfers’ time and attention, not domain names per se. Note, for 
example, the drop-off in renewal rates for domain names starting in summer 2001. See, 
e.g., Gwendolyn Mariano, It’s a Smaller World Wide Web After All, CNET NEWS.COM, at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-801088.html?legacy=cnet (Jan. 2, 2002). 
 132. circa summer 2002. 
 133. We assume that readers have a working understanding of the domain name sys-
tem. Brief, non-technical introductions to the domain name system can be found in a va-
riety of places, both online and off. See, e.g., Radin & Wagner, supra note 1, at 1303; 
Diane Cabell, Name Conflicts, in LEARNING CYBERLAW IN CYBERSPACE (1999), at 
http://www.cyberspacelaw.org/cabell/index.html. 
 134. Internet communications are “packet-based,” meaning that transmissions are 
separated into small data units, wrapped in addressing (and other) information, and sent 
across the Internet. In order to reach their destination, packets must be addressed with the 
appropriate “IP address”—a unique number corresponding to each machine connected to 
the Internet. When an Internet user requests a page using a domain name (say, for exam-
ple, www.yahoo.com, the domain name system provides the correct IP address.  
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that some parts of the database are more important than others. For the 
purpose of illustrating this point, the Article will consider the system as 
having three distinct levels:  the “root” level, the “TLD” level, and the 
“user” level, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1:  Domain Name Hierarchy 
 
        
 
The user DNS servers respond to individual groups of users or ma-
chines—for example, subscribers to a particular ISP or those within a cor-
porate or university network. That is, the user DNS servers for the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania contain the addressing information for the machines 
relating to upenn.edu, the University of Pennsylvania’s assigned domain 
name, and serve DNS queries sent by these machines.135  
The TLD servers hold the addressing information for the user DNS 
servers about an entire top-level-domain. Here, the .edu TLD server would 
contain (among others) the addressing information for the upenn.edu DNS 
server.136  
                                                                                                                        
 135. For example, the IP address for the machine with the name law.upenn.edu is 
130.91.144.200. This information is maintained by the Penn DNS servers, the primary 
one of which is located at 128.91.254.4. 
 136. This information is easily found by conducting a “whois” query on the appropri-
ate database. A web-based user interface to one such database can be found at 
http://www.netsol.com/cgi-bin/whois/whois. The whois record for upenn.edu contains the 
following DNS data (last visited July 21, 2002): 





The “root servers” hold addressing information relating to the TLD 
servers, such as the location of the .edu TLD server.137 Because DNS re-
quests for out-of-network resources (say a user in the Penn network re-
quests the address corresponding to www.yahoo.com) will in theory138 re-
quire requests to each level of the DNS system described above, it be-
comes apparent that the hierarchy of the system determines the number of 
requests to which the various servers must respond. That is, the .edu TLD 
server will (absent caching) be involved in all out-of-network requests in-
volving the .edu domain, and the root server will be involved in essentially 
all DNS requests. 
This distributed hierarchy, then, has unquestionable regulatory signifi-
cance:  involvement in DNS requests means an ability to exert power, at 
least over the immediately higher (in our Figure 1) DNS level. Indeed, the 
regulatory significance of the DNS hierarchy is what ICANN, the present 
administrator of the public root server system, uses to ensure universal 
adoption of the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). Because 
ICANN controls the root servers, it determines the status of the TLD serv-
ers. Further, ICANN can essentially exert full regulatory control over the 
domain name system by mandating that any TLD administration applicant 
either:  (a) agree to require its domain name registrants to consent to the 
provisions of the UDRP; or, (b) seek ICANN’s specific approval for any 
alterations from the UDRP.139 
                                                                                                                        
Domain servers in listed order: 
noc3.dccs.upenn.edu 128.91.254.4 
noc2.dccs.upenn.edu 128.91.254.1 
dns1.udel.edu  128.175.13.16 
dns2.udel.edu  128.175.13.17 










 138. As a practical matter, local DNS servers often “cache” recent requests. 
 139. See ICANN, New TLD Application Process Overview, at http://www.icann.org/-
tlds/application-process-03aug00.htm (Aug. 3, 2000) (“For unsponsored TLDs, ICANN 
will have policy-formulation responsibility for the new TLD and the policies will initially 
be generally defined as the existing policies for .com, .net, and .org . . . ”). Of course 
ICANN can (and does) delegate some policymaking authority to TLD operators, most 
prominently in the case of a “sponsored” TLD—where ICANN delegates some policy-
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B. Mapping Control:  Geography and the Domain Name System 
Thus far we have described what might be called “logical” control 
over the domain name system:  the technological ability to exert power by 
virtue of administration of the important components of the DNS sys-
tem.140 And yet while this alone raises a number of interesting ques-
tions,141 we want to raise a slightly different set of issues:  those surround-
ing the realspace sovereigns’ approach to regulation of the domain name 
system. 
The domain name system unquestionably exists in realspace. It is 
merely a collection of computer hardware and software (and people who 
administer and maintain them); each of these constituent components is 
“real” in any sense of the word, and can be found at various geographic 
points throughout the world. As such, it is possible to map the domain 
name system onto realspace, where concepts like borders and sovereignty 
are crucially important (at least from a regulatory perspective). Thus, the 
resulting map of the distributed hierarchy of the domain name system has 
what might be called "territorial" regulatory significance. It is to the impli-
cations of this territorial regulatory significance that we now turn. 
C. The Significance of Territorial Regulation 
Territorial significance plays out in at least two ways. First, as an in-
ternational legal matter, the geographic location of the domain name sys-
tem may be widely recognized as supporting a strong claim to prescriptive 
(or legislative) jurisdiction over various disputes that arise relating to the 
system. Second, even if a prescriptive jurisdictional claim is not widely 
recognized, the geographic location of the domain name system may 
                                                                                                                        
making authority to the sponsoring organization. See ICANN, New TLD Program, at 
http://www.icann.org/tlds/ (last updated July 18, 2002) (“Generally speaking, an 'unspon-
sored' TLD operates under policies established by the global Internet community directly 
through the ICANN process, while a 'sponsored' TLD is a specialized TLD that has a 
sponsor representing the narrower community that is most affected by the TLD. The 
sponsor thus carries out delegated policy-formulation responsibilities over many matters 
concerning the TLD"). Nonetheless, the control (provided by administration of the root 
server system) is there. 
 140. This general view—the correlation between control over technology and poli-
cymaking—is a common theme in recent “cyberlaw” scholarship. For an excellent over-
view, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). 
 141. Many issues surround the ICANN's establishment as the authoritative body for 
the present public root server system. See generally Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the 
Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (2000); Milton Mueller, supra note 1, at 477-
500. See also the excellent material relating to ICANN collected by ICANN Watch, a 
watchdog organization, at http://www.icannwatch.org/. 
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nonetheless determine whether (and to what extent) realspace sovereigns 
can regulate the system. However, the geographic location of the domain 
name system is essentially arbitrary. That is, while the logical regulatory 
significance of the hierarchy of the domain name system is inherent in the 
technology, the geography is not. Put simply, the root servers could move, 
taking with them the territorial regulatory significance. Furthermore, a re-
alspace sovereign142 set on increasing the present regulatory authority 
available to itself—either recognized under international law or de facto—
could alter the geographic facts, by creating additional root servers and 
requiring their use. This observation suggests a reconsideration of the aims 
of present regulation of the domain name system by realspace sovereigns, 
in particular the United States’ approach embodied in the ACPA. We take 
up this final point in Section IV below, while first discussing the dual im-
plications of territoriality and the domain name system.  
1. Recognized Authority:  Prescriptive Jurisdiction & Domain 
Names 
We turn first (and briefly) to the significance of prescriptive jurisdic-
tional claims.143  
a) The Principles of Prescriptive Jurisdiction 
As a general matter, international law widely recognizes at least two 
bases of prescriptive jurisdiction:144 the principles of territoriality145 and 
nationality.146  
                                                                                                                        
 142. Or set of sovereigns, of course. For example, a group of sovereigns, perhaps 
organized regionally or culturally, might establish and mandate its own root server sys-
tem, with shared or delegated policy authority. 
 143. This subsection is not intended as a comprehensive description of the issues 
surrounding prescriptive jurisdiction. Rather, our goal is to provide context to support our 
argument that the geography of the domain system will have realspace regulatory impli-
cations. 
 144. We use the terms “legislative jurisdiction” and “prescriptive jurisdiction” inter-
changeably here, given the context in which we write: the analysis of the scope of Con-
gressional authority to legislate on the matter of domain names. Se , e.g., RESTATEMENT 
OF THE LAW, THIRD, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 401(a) (1987) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
 145. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 402(1); BARRY CARTER & PHILIP TRIM-
BLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 728-733 (2d ed. 1995). 
 146. RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 402(2); CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 145, 
at 728. Other recognized principles of prescriptive jurisdiction include: (a) the “protec-
tive” principle; (b) the “passive personality” principle; and, (c) the “universality” princi-
ple. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 145, at 728-733. Each of these, while estab-
lished in international law, is applied in specific circumstances unlikely to implicate dis-
putes over domain names. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 402 cmt. f (de-
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“Territoriality” refers to the notion that a sovereign state has a claim to 
prescribe conduct within its physical territory,147 and the “status of per-
sons, or interests in things, present within its territory.”148 Although some 
commentators have suggested that the territorial principle should be the 
complete basis for asserting prescriptive jurisdiction,149 the modern view 
recognizes that the territorial principle is both under- and over-inclusive:  
it fails to account for cases in which states have a legitimate claim to pre-
scriptive jurisdiction, and must yield in certain circumstances to extraterri-
torial principles that have developed to address the under-inclusiveness.150 
Indeed, some commentators question the continuing viability of the terri-
torial principle in the context of the international economic system and the 
United States’ role in the world economy.151 
The principle of “nationality” is also rooted in traditional notions of 
state sovereignty, though in this case the “sovereignty” refers to the state’s 
citizens or subjects, rather than the state’s physical territory.152 As typi-
cally stated, nationality refers to the right to prescribe “the activities, inter-
                                                                                                                        
scribing protective principle); RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 402 cmt. g (describing 
passive personality); RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 404 (describing universality). See 
generally CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 145, at 777-89; MARK JANIS, INTRODUCTION 
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 329-330 (2d ed. 1993); J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 225-226 (9th ed. 1984).  
 147. “It is an essential attribute of the sovereignty of this realm, as of all sovereign 
independent States, that it should possess jurisdiction over all persons and things within 
its territorial limits and in all causes civil and criminal arising within these limits.” J.G. 
STARKE, supra note 146, at 194 (quoting Lord Macmillan). “The principles of the territo-
rial sovereignty and the jurisdiction of states have been two of the most fundamental 
principles of international law.” JANIS, supra note 146, at 322-23. 
 148. RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 402(1)(b). 
 149. “[T]he character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by 
the law of the country where the act is done. . . . For another jurisdiction, if it should hap-
pen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather than those of 
the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but wo ld be an interference 
with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other 
state concerned justly might resent.” Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 
356-357 (1909) (Holmes, J.). 
 150. This recognition, however, is not without controversy. See infra note 160 and 
accompanying text. 
 151. See generally Jonathan R. Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct 
and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598 (1990). See also 
Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1464 (1991) 
(noting the difficulty of currently-justifying a presumption against extraterritoriality). 
 152. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932) (“Nor can it be 
doubted that the United States possesses the power inherent in sovereignty to require the 
return to this country of a citizen, resident elsewhere, whenever the public interest re-
quires it, and to penalize him in the case of refusal”).  
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ests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its terri-
tory.”153 
While the invocation of basic international legal principles upon which 
sovereigns may prescribe behavior at least implies limits upon the scope of 
such jurisdictional claims,154 the modern reality is rather different. The 
trend since early in the twentieth century, particularly with respect to the 
United States, has been towards “increasingly expansive” views of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction.155 For example, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States suggests that prescriptive jurisdiction 
clearly exists with respect to any activities that have “substantial effect[s]” 
in the United States.156 The U.S. Supreme Court has vacillated confusingly 
on this issue,157 but it is nonetheless clear that, to the extent that they exist 
at all,158 limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction in this context are largely a 
matter of international political considerations.159 
The generally hortatory nature of international legal limitations on pre-
scriptive jurisdiction paradoxically illuminates the importance of such as-
sertions that are based largely on the traditionally-accepted bases of terri-
                                                                                                                        
 153. RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 402(2). 
 154. See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES 
COURTS 493 (3d ed. 1996). 
 155. Id. at 501. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, pt. IV, ch. 1, introductory 
note; Burbank, supra note 151, at 1460-61 (noting the parallel nature of the “loosening of 
mandatory controls on the exercise of lawmaking power” in both domestic and interna-
tional cases in United States courts).  
 156. RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 402(1)(c). Such extraterritorial application is, 
according to the RESTATEMENT § 403, limited by what Professor Burbank describes as 
“the jurisdictional ‘rule of reason’.” Burbank, supra note 151, at 1464.  
 157. Compare EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) 
(invoking a presumption against extraterritorial application of laws in refusing to extend 
Title VII to extraterritorial application), with Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 
U.S. 764, 795-99 (1993) (extending application of Sherman Act to extraterritorial con-
duct by virtue of effects in the United States).  
 158. See BORN, supra note 154, at 510-511 (noting that it is “well established” that 
U.S. laws may violate customary international law and yet be enforceable—at least in 
U.S. courts); United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). See also Burbank, 
supra note 151, at 1463 (noting the weakness of international legal limits on prescriptive 
jurisdiction). 
 159. As a practical matter such issues arise in the U.S. context because (and when) 
Congress has failed to specify the scope of a statute’s jurisdiction. See Burbank, supra 
note 151, at 1463; BORN, supra note 154, at 510-11. Thus questions of “limits” on U.S. 
legislative jurisdiction are analyzed chiefly through the lens of statutory interpretation, 
and international principles of jurisdiction are implemented as presumptions in favor of 
one statutory construction versus another. S e, e.g., ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 248; Hartford 
Fire, 509 U.S. at 795-99. See generally Burbank, supra note 151, at 1463-65.  
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toriality and nationality. That is, recent history demonstrates that the ex-
pansion of (at least) U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction beyond these boundaries 
generates substantial international controversy160; accordingly, where such 
assertions of jurisdiction comport with territoriality and nationality, we 
can expect—at minimum—less international dispute. 
b) Prescribing Domain Names 
If territoriality and nationality are important bases of international pre-
scriptive jurisdiction—at least in a political economy, if not practical, 
sense—then it follows that the interaction between these principles and the 
geographic and technologic realities of the domain name system will have 
regulatory significance. Because we are especially interested in the United 
States’ present regulatory approach (i.e., the ACPA, especially the in rem 
provisions161), and because the current geographic facts of the domain 
name system are remarkably U.S.-based, this discussion will necessarily 
be heavily U.S.-focused. (Note that in the particular context in which 
Congress has presently acted—legislating for domain name disputes as 
they relate to trademarks—there will be one or more registered U.S. 
trademarks involved.162 For purposes of our argument, however, we set 
aside the international trademark issues.163) 
                                                                                                                        
 160. One commentator notes more than fifteen “blocking statutes” passed by other 
nations in response to extraterritorial application of the United States antitrust laws. See 
Joseph P. Griffin, United States Antitrust Laws and Transnational Business Transac-
tions: An Introduction, 21 INT'L LAW. 307, 308-309 (1987). See also BORN, supra note 
154, at 584-587 (noting “protests” against extraterritorial application); Thomas C. 
Fischer, Case Two: Extraterritorial Application of United States Law Against United 
States and Alien Defendants (Sherman Act), 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 577, 586 & n.38 
(1995). 
 161. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).  
 162. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (allowing claims based on infringement of a “mark”). 
Federal trademarks are registered by application to the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-72. 
 163. It is an understatement to say that the application of trademark law to the online 
context presents difficult international law issues. Dinwoodie has noted that the continued 
expansive interpretation of national trademarks in the online context threatens to “re-
duce” trademark rights to “their most destructive form”—the mutual ability to block (or 
at least interfere with) the online use of marks recognized in other countries. Graeme 
Dinwoodie, Private International Aspects of the Protection of Trademarks (Jan. 19, 
2001) (WIPO Doc. No. WIPO/PIL/01/4), available at http://wipo.int/pilforum/en/-
documents/pdf/pil_01_4.pdf. Accordingly, the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) approved in Fall 2001 a resolution calling for a more flexible recognition of 
“use” of trademarks on the Internet, one that would provide protections from liability for 
legitimate users of marks who disclaimed the intent to conduct commerce in a particular 
country. See WIPO. Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of 
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Our analysis suggests that the present form of the domain name system 
offers the United States a strong claim of prescriptive jurisdiction along 
several dimensions of the analysis. Maintaining our focus on the bases of 
nationality and territoriality, we note the following important factors in-
volved in this analysis: 
Citizenship. The citizenship of the parties to the dispute obviously in-
vokes the nationality principle, supporting the prescriptive claim for any 
corresponding sovereign. 
TLD Server Location. Because almost all domain name disputes will 
arise in the context of second-level domain names, the most direct author-
ity over and responsibility for these domain names will rest with the 
operation of the relevant TLD server, thereby supporting the prescriptive 
claim of the sovereign in which that server is located.164 
Root Server Location. As noted above, control over the root server al-
lows at least some level of control over the entire system, though at times 
this support will be indirect.165 As such, the geographic location of the root 
server will support—though to a lesser degree than the location of the 
TLD server—the assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction based on the princi-
ple of territoriality. 
Focusing on the United States, we note that the primary root server 
(a.root-servers.net) is located within the United States.166 The array of 
possibilities for prescriptive claims are: 
                                                                                                                        
Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet (October 2001) 
(WIPO Pub. No. 845), available at http://www.wipo.org/aboutip/en/development_-
iplaw/pub845.htm. 
  We set aside the issues specific to international application of US trademark law 
for several reasons. Most generally, we consider the truly notable question here to be 
Congress’ approach to the regulation of domain names, especially the self-styled in rem 
provisions of the ACPA; in this view, the effects on the international regulation of trade-
marks are parasitic on a particular view of domain names as what one of us has described 
as “a species of mutant trademark.” Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of 
Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1295, 1303 (1999). Here, looking beyond the mutant trademark aspects of domain names 
allows, we hope, for a more focused consideration of the challenges facing sovereigns in 
cyberspace. 
 164. Note that for simplicity, we are conflating the location of the actual hardware 
(i.e., the machine) that constitutes the TLD server, and the location of the administrative 
authority. We assume, for the purposes of our argument, that the hardware will typically 
be in the same country as the administrators and system operators. 
 165. See supra text accompanying note 139. 
 166. As of July 30, 2002, a lookup of a.root-servers.net reveals an IP address of 




Table 1:  U.S. Prescriptive Jurisdictional Claims 
case party citizenship TLD server location recognized prescrip-
tive claim 
1 US US US 
2 mixed US US 
3 non-US US US 
4 US non-US US 
5 mixed non-US US 
6 non-US non-US unclear 
 
Cases 1 and 2 are relatively easy:  in each, both nationality and territo-
riality support the U.S. claim; in Case 2, there is a potential competing 
claim based on nationality, but the clear weight of the interests balances in 
favor of the U.S.167 Case 3 is perhaps more controversial. If the non-US 
citizens are from separate countries, then there are at least three potentially 
competing claims. Among the three, we suggest that none will have a 
“clearly greater” interest than the U.S. If the non-US citizens are from the 
same country, then the relative claim of that country would seem 
stronger.168 In Cases 4 and 5, the U.S. claim is supported by nationality, as 
well as the basis for territoriality provided by the location of the root 
server.169 In our view, the location of the TLD server does not provide a 
“clearly greater” claim in this context, though we admit these Cases are 
close. 
                                                                                                                        
the physical location of a.root-servers.net is revealed as Herndon, Virginia, USA (or ap-
proximately 38º 98’ N, 77º 39’ W). 
 167. Where multiple sovereign states have significant and potentially-conflicting 
claims to jurisdiction, courts will often resort to devices that compare—or balance—the 
relative strengths of the interests. For example, pursuant to RESTATEMENT § 403(3), su-
pra note 144, when multiple countries have competing claims, a “clearly greater” claim 
must be recognized. See also Burbank, supra note 151, at 1463-64 (noting the techniques 
for resolving these conflicts). 
 168. See, e.g., Heathmount v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Va. 
2000) (ACPA action between Canadian citizens). The court in Heathmount did not ad-
dress this issue. 
 169. Note that the analysis of the “effects” of domain name activity is likely to ap-
proximate a wash in cases where the DNS system is available worldwide. That is, the 
effects of a domain name in the United States is likely to be similar to the effects of the 
same domain name in another country; both states might be able to note the effects in 




Case 6 has an uncertain result. Of course, the U.S. would have at least 
some support from the principle of territoriality as a consequence of the 
location of the root server. We think, however, that this support would be 
less than the support provided by the location of the TLD server. Yet that 
would be the full extent of the support for the U.S. claim, leading us to 
conclude that the U.S. claim will likely (though not certainly) be out-
weighed by a competing claim, especially if the location of the TLD 
server and the citizenship of at least one of the parties corresponds. 
This exercise leads us to two points. First, even though the U.S. Con-
stitution severely limits the impact of the in rem provisions of the 
ACPA,170 the U.S. prescriptive jurisdictional claim (under the widely-
recognized principles of territoriality and nationality) appears to be quite 
strong generally. Second, as far as recognizable claims of prescriptive ju-
risdiction goes, geography matters:  the physical location of the TLD and 
root servers plays a crucial role in evaluating potentially competing claims 
of prescriptive jurisdiction, at least according to the traditional bases of 
territoriality and nationality. Here, the geographic fact that the root servers 
(at least the primary one and its administration) and the most populated 
TLD servers are geographically located within the United States, grants 
the United States a considerable amount of regulatory latitude under rec-
ognized principles of international jurisdiction. And while the U.S. gov-
ernment has, we think, a limited ability to exercise jurisdiction over do-
main name disputes as a Constitutional matter, other sovereigns may not 
be so limited.171 As we note below, this insight has substantial implica-
tions. 
2. De Facto Regulatory Significance 
Even if a particular sovereign’s claims for prescriptive jurisdiction are 
unrecognized or controversial under international legal principles, the ge-
ography of the domain name system can nonetheless provide substantial 
regulatory leverage. This de facto regulatory significance flows from the 
distributed hierarchy of the domain name system:  a sovereign can exer-
cise control over the domain name system to the extent that elements of 
the domain name system are under its potential physical control. This 
                                                                                                                        
 170. As we analyzed in section II above, these in rem provisions, found in 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(d)(2) apply to cases of anonymous registrants and cases involving registrants 
lacking minimum contacts with the United States. In the latter cases, the assertion of in 
rem jurisdiction over the domain name will violate due process.  
 171. This assumes the same level of geographic connections to the critical features of 
the domain name system. As we note in Section IV below, sovereigns can also take steps 
to alter the geographic facts in their favor. 
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typically comes from the elements being geographically located within the 
sovereign’s territory. For example, because the administration of the root 
server offers logical control over the entire domain name system,172 sover-
eign control over the root server would then allow de facto control over 
the domain name system. 
For example, consider the case of the United States, under the present 
geographic and technical facts of the domain name system. In principle, 
Congress could pass laws (or an agency could issue regulations) directed 
to the public root server system. Perhaps these laws might specify the 
standards by which TLDs would get access to the root servers, or even 
specify the TLDs and their policies themselves. These laws might give 
preferences to U.S. companies and individuals in domain name disputes, 
charge taxes on any entity using a domain name, or specify the types of 
uses that domain names can be put to.173 By controlling the root server, the 
U.S. government could effectively control the TLD servers by threatening 
banishment from the public root server system and the concomitant loss of 
operation. And by controlling the TLD servers, the U.S. government could 
exercise de facto control over the entire range of second-level domain 
names available in the public root server system. 
There is no evidence at all, we think, that the United States govern-
ment is planning any activities of this sort.174 Nor, of course, are we advo-
cating such a course, as we argue in some detail below. At present, even 
the most aggressive assertion of jurisdiction we describe here—the in rem 
provisions of the ACPA—falls well short of the sort of widespread de 
facto control set forth above. Yet the point we noted above remains:  geog-
raphy matters. Put simply, both recognized and de facto control over the 
domain name system are remarkably correlated with geographic facts. 
This, we think, has considerable implications for the future of the domain 
name system. 
                                                                                                                        
 172. At least over the domain name system utilizing that root server. As we noted 
above, this is how ICANN presently exerts nearly complete policy control over the do-
main name system. See supra notes 139 and accompanying text. 
 173. Obviously, the U.S. Constitution would provide an important limit to such regu-
lations, especially those that might implicate rights of free expression. See, e.g., U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. Note, however, that such constraints would not necessarily restrict 
similar actions by other sovereigns. 
 174. See generally William J. Clinton and Albert Gore, A Framework for Global 
Electronic Commerce (The White Paper) (July 1, 1997), available at http://www.-
ejus.it/db/data/Framework_Electronic_commerce_1-7-97.htm; U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and Internet 




IV. THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF REALSPACE SOVEREIGNS 
Thus far we have analyzed the aspects of logical and territorial control 
over the domain name system, arguing that in the context of realspace 
sovereigns, the mapping of the logical control structure onto the physical 
world results in a regulatory hierarchy. That is, those states with critical 
components of the domain name system in their territory could have great 
regulatory leverage over the system as a whole. This argument leads to 
two other important observations. First, we note that the geographic facts 
of the domain name system are both essentially arbitrary and uniquely mu-
table attributes,175 thereby providing realspace sovereigns with an impor-
tant hook to attempt to alter the geographic facts in their favor. Second, 
and following from the first, we argue that the likely result of greater regu-
latory activism by various realspace sovereigns will be the segmentation 
of the domain name system, and the dramatic reduction in utility provided 
by the system itself. 
A. Geographic Alteration:  The Virtual Land Grab 
Assume that Country X decides that the present quasi-U.S. approach to 
the regulation of the domain name system is not in its interest. Perhaps this 
country is troubled by the present strong protection of commercial trade-
marks embedded in both the ICANN-mandated policies and the ACPA.176 
Or perhaps Country X disagrees with the principles of free expression that 
have been held to extend to domain name disputes.177 Or Country X might 
simply see the domain name system as a potential source of revenue.178 
Whatever the reason, it is clear that Country X would have substantial 
ability to at least attempt to alter the geographic facts. Country X could 
establish a root server system of its own, and mandate that local networks 
                                                                                                                         
 175. Given the distributed hierarchical nature of the DNS, the geographic location of 
the “A” root servers is not especially relevant to the operation of the system. Se  supra 
text accompanying notes 132-139. 
 176. See supra note 129 and accompanying text, and the Introductory Section. 
 177. See, e.g., Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166 
(C.D. Cal. 1999) (rejecting trademark claim against use of a domain name because of, 
inter alia, First Amendment concerns). See generally L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, 
Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (discussing First Amendment and Trademark Law). 
 178. See, e.g., Anna Soderblom, Island Joins the Dots and Will Net Fortune, THE 
TIMES (LONDON), Nov. 6, 2000 (noting that the island nation of Tuvalu expects to net 
over $50 million from registrations in the .tv TLD space, “or about three times Tuvalu's 
gross domestic product”). The Tuvalu case is slightly different than what we suggest 
here, of course, as Tuvalu controls only the .v TLD, rather than the root server. 
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use the “official” root server.179 In a fairly benign form of this “virtual 
land grab,” the Country X root server might mirror or link to the existing 
public root server system, and merely offer additional TLDs.180 Country X 
would be able to exert regulatory control over the additional TLDs, while 
the remaining TLDs would be unaffected and remain available to Country 
X users. A more troubling arrangement would be if Country X limited, or 
reassigned the TLDs available in the new root server, or otherwise created 
conflicts between its root server and the public server. This second set of 
circumstances creates great potential for the segmentation of the world-
wide domain name system, and the dramatic reduction in the value of the 
system. 
B. Segmenting Domain Names 
The domain name system becomes “segmented” when:  (1) the same 
DNS requests sent by users in different networks yield different results; or 
(2) some number of TLDs are unavailable to users, depending upon the 
root server system they use. Both of these circumstances arise when dif-
ferent root server systems are used—though the existence and use of dif-
ferent root servers is a necessary but not a sufficient condition.181  
Segmentation arises when the various root server systems in use are ei-
ther in conflict, or do not accurately reflect the content of other root serv-
ers. For example, the official “Country X Root Server” might send re-
quests for the .com TLD to a different server than the ICANN a.root-
servers.net, thereby creating a conflict—resulting in, for example, a re-
quest for www.yahoo.com yielding a different web page in different net-
works.182 Or the Country X Root Server might ignore requests for the .com
TLD altogether, rendering a large part of the domain name system unus-
able (for its users). An even more likely case is that any additional TLDs 
                                                                                                                        
 179. Alternatively, the regulations could identify a private “alternative” root server 
system—perhaps as part of a wider agreement involving policies, taxation, etc. Such al-
ternative root server systems already exist. See, e.g., New.net, Mission Statement, at
http://www.new.net/about_us_mission.tp (last visited July 25, 2002).  
 180. This type of arrangement has been described as a “virtual inclusive root”. See S. 
Higgs, Root Zone Definitions, at http://www.simon.higgs.com/net/draft-higgs-root-
definitions.txt (May 2001). 
 181. As noted in S. Higg’s Root Zone Definitions, multiple root server systems pres-
ently exist with little, if any, problems for the system. Higgs, supra note 180. Higgs in 
particular describes “private” root server systems, which are not publicly available and 
are intended to serve only a single network, as well as “inclusive” root servers, which 
expand the TLDs available on the standard root server system. Id. 
 182. This would not necessarily be the case, of course. Depending upon the details of 
Country X’s redistribution plan, Yahoo!, Inc. might purchase the rights to yah o.com in 
the County X Root Server zone. 
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established by Country X may not be recognized by the public root server 
system, thereby making them unavailable to the Internet user community 
at large.183 
We predict that segmentation would result under the following cir-
cumstances:   
First, a new root server system (formed or mandated by a sovereign’s 
regulatory activity) could create conflicts with the existing public root 
server system. These conflicts could result in unexpected behavior or the 
inability for certain segments of the global Internet to utilize TLDs pub-
licly available elsewhere. 
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, segmentation must be 
considered a potential response by one or more sovereigns to any others’ 
attempts to exert unwanted regulatory influence over the domain name 
system. For example, if Country X established its own root server system, 
and established policies for expanded TLDs that were in conflict with the 
policies of Country Y, a potential response for Country Y would be to re-
sponsively create (or mandate) a root server system that effectively 
“blocked” the Country X TLDs. Lest this possibility seem farfetched, con-
sider China’s recent suggestion that it would take steps to ensure that it 
controlled the distribution and administration of all Chinese-character do-
main names—a task that certainly implicates the creation of alternative 
root server systems, or the threat thereof.184 
                                                                                                                        
 183. Note that we distinguish here between what we call “segmentation” of the do-
main name system and the present use and availability of “alternative” or “inclusive” root 
server systems. In terms of numbers of users, the major alternative root server systems 
differ from the hypothetical segmented system we outline above because they explicitly 
include the information provided by the public root server system, and because they are 
created by and backed with market forces, not sovereign government regulatory action. 
We recognize that such alternative root server systems may stimulate much-needed inno-
vation and competition in the field of domain name administration. Yet the increasing 
popularity of such services only increases the chances that true segmentation develops. 
 184. See, e.g., Rachel Ross, China Demands Jurisdiction Over Domain Names In 
Chinese, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 13, 2000 (“We think that as 97.5 per cent of the people 
using Chinese characters live in the mainland and Taiwan, the U.S. government has no 
right to authorize any company to manage Chinese domain names with Chinese charac-
ters,’ said CNNIC director Hu Qiheng . . . . ‘A company shouldn't be allowed to provide 
Chinese domain names registration services in China without the approval of the Chinese 
government.’”); Character Debate: CNNIC Opposes Foreign Firms Registering Chinese-
Language Domain Names, CHINAONLINE, Nov. 3, 2000 (explaining how China is object-
ing to the registration and use of Chinese-character domain names by foreign entities); 
Furious Fight Arises in Registration of Chinese Domain Names, Xinhua General News 
Service, Nov. 17, 2000 (same); China to Strengthen Management of Chinese-Character 
Domain Names, CHINAONLINE, Nov. 15, 2000 (same); China Channel, CNNIC Disagree 
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As should be easily apparent, segmentation of the domain name sys-
tem would dramatically decrease its value to the Internet user commu-
nity.185 As a means of searching and selecting online resources, the do-
main name system’s value is directly related to its scope; its value is at its 
highest when the system includes all named online resources. Importantly, 
if the domain name system cannot reliably be considered authoritative of 
the resources available, its value diminishes remarkably—if an Internet 
user does not have confidence that typing www.yahoo.com will yield the 
information she expects, then the DNS request will be of far less value. 
And while there are good arguments that the domain name system has out-
lived its usefulness as a uniform means of addressing the Internet search-
ing problem, we think that an unsegmented domain name system remains 
a significant value to Internet users.186 This premise—that an unsegmented 
domain name system is desirable—has substantial policy implications for 
realspace sovereigns.  
C. Unsegmenting Policy:  Realspace Sovereigns and Domain 
Names 
The present United States approach to domain name regulation—at 
least as reflected in legislation187—appears to be focused solely on the po-
                                                                                                                        
Over Chinese Character International Domain Names, CHINAONLINE, Oct. 10, 2000 
(same). At present, the ICANN-approved registrars are still registering such domain 
names. See Verisign, Key Points About the VeriSign Global Registry Services Interna-
tionalized Domain Name Testbed, at http://www.verisigngrs.com/idn/testbed/keypts.html 
(last visited July, 26 2002). 
 185. This appears to be a nearly universal sentiment. See, e.g., Internet Architecture 
Board (Network Working Group), IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root, at 
http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2826.html (May 2000); ICANN, ICP-3: A Unique, Authorita-
tive Root for the DNS, at http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-3.htm (July 9, 2001). 
 186. We think a significant argument can be made that the development of a seg-
mented domain name system would dramatically devalue the current system and generate 
alternatives to the searching and selection problem that may prove at least as effective as 
the present domain name system. One obvious example might be an increasing invest-
ment in web search engines or directories. Or the development of new technologies, such 
as the former RealNames “keywords” system. See, e.g., RealNames Corp., About Internet 
Keywords, at http://web.archive.org/web/20011031162600/www.realnames.com/Virtual.-
asp?page=Eng_Corporate_How_Work (last visited July 25, 2002).The rise of and even-
tual replacement by alternatives to the domain name system should not necessarily be 
viewed as unfortunate. Nonetheless, an unsegmented domain name system appears at 
present to be high on the list of valuable approaches to the searching problem. 
 187. An interesting aspect of this issue is the apparent tension between the assertive 
approach taken by the Congress in passing the ACPA, especially the in rem provisions, 
and the more “hands off” version followed by the Clinton Administration. See, e.g., Clin-
ton & Gore, supra note 175; U.S. Dept. of Commerce, supra note 175. 
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tential for harm to a particular form of indigenous commercial interests:  
trademarks. Little legislative attention has be paid to the significant value 
in the unsegmented domain name system, or more particularly, the signifi-
cant diminishment in value should the system become segmented. This 
omission becomes all the more serious when one considers that the ag-
gressive assertion of jurisdiction in the ACPA188 may well satisfy the con-
ditions under which the domain name system becomes segmented:  the 
encouragement of responsive actions on the part of other sovereigns.189 
This is a perilous path, one that risks harming the growth and development 
of the global Internet, and correspondingly portends harm to United States 
interests. 
In this section, we briefly discuss the justifications and contours of a 
more encompassing approach to the regulation of domain names by real-
space sovereigns—in particular the United States. Such an approach, we 
argue, would result in greater deference to and support of the growth of 
nonterritorial regulatory devices for this uniquely global asset, thereby de-
creasing the momentum towards segmentation. 
1. Encompassing Interests 
Given that the growth of e-commerce development thus far has largely 
benefited U.S. commercial interests,190 the continued development of the 
Internet should be viewed as beneficial; concomitantly, obstacles to such 
growth should be avoided.191 We have established above that an unseg-
mented domain name system is significantly more valuable to the global 
Internet community than one that is partially or fully segmented. It fol-
                                                                                                                        
 188. A claim, we suggest, that can be seen most expansively in the ACPA’s in rem 
proceedings. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
 189. See supra Section III.C.1. 
 190. Measurement of the commercial activity online is, of course, subject to various 
problems. But under any set of criteria, the United States seems to be doing quite well. 
The top ten most visited “web properties” worldwide are all U.S. companies. Se  Neil-
sen/Netratings, Top 25 Web Properties, available at http://www.nielsennetratings.-
com/pr/pr011113.pdf (Nov. 14, 2001). The top ten electronic commerce sites (measured 
in terms of customer sales) are entirely American. See NextCard, Ecommerce Index, at 
http://www.nextcard.com/Indexes/sept_index_movers10_05_01.html (Sep. 2001). The 
top ten e-commerce businesses in terms of market share are entirely American. See 
Nearly Half of All Americans Buy Online, According to Nielsen//NetRatings and Harris 
Interactive; $3.5 Billion Spent Online in March, Jumping 36 Percent in Past Year, BUSI-
NESSWIRE,, at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=273 
(Apr. 24, 2001). 
 191. Note here we are setting aside the many (and significant) non-commercial 




lows, then, that avoiding segmentation must be included as a significant 
factor in the regulatory calculation for realspace sovereigns. 
We can review this broader approach by explicitly considering the 
harm due to segmentation. Stylizing the situation under a two-player 
game, we will assume two binary choices:  either to assert prescriptive ju-
risdiction and regulate, or defer to other sovereign entities.192 We consider 
three outcomes, with arbitrary numbers assigned for illustrative purposes. 
First, if both states defer, the system will remain unsegmented. If only one 
state regulates (and no other state retaliates by segmenting), the system 
will remain unsegmented, with some additional benefit flowing to the 
regulator. And if both states regulate, the system becomes segmented, re-
sulting in a diminishment of value. Figure 2 sets forth this basic situation, 




Here, the U.S. decision would be to regulate, on the assumption that 
State X’s response would be to defer.193 Thus, the Figure 1 example might 
                                                                                                                        
 192. As should be apparent, there are a number of “middle grounds” here that these 
models fail to adequately capture. 
 193. This is a form of a dynamic game with complete information, as State X can 
easily see the U.S. decision. The sub-game represented by the top branch has expected 
payoffs of (100, 125), while the bottom branch has payoffs of (125, 100). Accordingly, 
the U.S. decision will be to regulate. See H. SCOTT BIERMAN & L UIS FERNANDEZ, GAME 
THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 124-135 (2d ed. 1998); DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL., 
@ 352%/(06:,7+7+($&3$ 

be said to describe the present status quo—where the U.S. has regulated to 
some degree,194 and other nations appear to be more deferential. 
Yet an adjustment in the payoffs could dramatically alter the nature of 




Here, we have adjusted the payoff State X perceives if the United 
States regulates and it does not. This reduction in payoff could be due to 
variety of factors, a few of which we have noted above.195 Under these 
new conditions, State X will choose to respond to the U.S. regulation with 
regulation, and the domain name system will become segmented. Accord-
ingly, the best U.S. decision is to defer. 
Figure 4 notes one final example, where the U.S. payoff to State X 







                                                                                                                        
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 50-77 (1994); ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES & INFORMATION 
108 (3d ed. 2001). 
 194. At least to the extent of the in rem provisions of the ACPA. 






Here again, the best U.S. decision is to regulate. That such a decision 
yields the suboptimal condition of segmentation reveals the nature of this 
game as a form of the prisoner’s dilemma.196 
(Note of course that a still better view of this problem is as a repeated 
game—that is, each sovereign has many opportunities to decide whether 
to regulate or defer. Thus, if the United States considered the assertion of 
regulation by another sovereign to be more harmful to its interests, it could 
take the next opportunity to respond by regulating—and thereby further 
confirm the suboptimal nature of this situation.) 
2. Towards Coordination 
The concerns outlined above describe a substantial danger that the pre-
sent domain name system will become segmented. And yet, as with most 
prisoner’s dilemmas, coordination provides a solution.197 In particular, our 
analysis here establishes the strong interests that realspace sovereigns, and 
especially the United States, have to coordinate their regulatory behavior 
with an eye to avoiding segmentation. 
                                                                                                                        
 196. The expected payoffs for the top branch are (25, 125), while the expected pay-
offs for the bottom branch are (50, 50).  
 197. See, e.g., BIERMAN & FERNANDEZ, supra note 193, at * (noting the difference in 
outcomes between cooperative games and noncooperative games); BAIRD ET AL., supra 
note 193, at * (observing the importance of “binding agreements” between parties facing 
a prisoner’s dilemma). 
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Such coordination will invariably require greater deference to nonterri-
torial domain name regulatory bodies. The paradigmatic example of this, 
of course, is ICANN. As many have observed, there are a number of sub-
stantial problems with the present form of ICANN.198 However, advocat-
ing international coordination does not, we think, necessarily require en-
dorsement of the present policies and procedures established by ICANN, 
or the way in which that organization has been developed. 
The challenge of integrating sovereign interests into a coherent inter-
national regulatory framework is plainly considerable,199 and we will not 
solve that problem here.200 Instead, having noted in particular the perverse 
incentives created by the current United States regulatory regime, and the 
strong interests the United States has in avoiding segmentation, we offer a 
few observations and suggestions for future consideration. 
1. The in rem provisions of the ACPA are misguided and 
should be repealed or substantially revised. They are of only 
limited value,201 and appear to serve primarily as a particu-
larly obnoxious example of expansive U.S. claims to regu-
late domain names.202 
2. The United States government (and other realspace sover-
eigns) should take a more active role in supporting the de-
velopment of international domain name policy coordina-
tion. The present ICANN approach of avoiding any signifi-
                                                                                                                         
 198. Such problems include questions about ICANN’s legitimacy, as well as its al-
leged bias against non-trademark holders. See, e.g., Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the 
Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (2000) (discussing legitimacy concerns); Mi-
chael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the 
ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. (alleging bias in the ICANN UDRP process). But 
see, e.g., Michael Kaplan, Never Cry Wolf: A Response to Professor's Geist's Condemna-
tion of the ICANN UDRP 1-11 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) 
(disputing any showing of bias). 
 199. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environ-
mental Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 760-88 (1999) (discussing the theories by which the 
development of international environmental regulation might be viewed); Barbara Stark, 
Economic Rights in the United States and International Human Rights Law: Toward an 
"Entirely New Strategy," 44 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 79-82 (1992) (discussing obstacles to 
adoption of international human rights law). See generally CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra 
note 145. 
 200. For a recent effort along these lines, see generally Paul Schiff Berman, The 
Globalization of Jurisdiction: Cyberspace, Nation-States, and Community Definition, 151 
U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002). 
 201. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
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cant government involvement, and instead attempting to 
build a strictly nongovernmental regulatory authority, fails to 
grasp the unavoidable involvement of realspace sovereigns 
in domain name regulation.203 Such support would include 
diplomatic efforts as well as concrete actions that lend addi-
tional credibility to these organizations. 
 3. Finally, Congress should consider revising the ACPA to 
reflect greater deference to the decisions of international 
regulatory bodies. For example, Congress might consider 
implementing a requirement that disputing parties seek reso-
lution from the international domain name regulatory body 
prior to filing a federal lawsuit.204 Alternatively, lawsuits 
concerning a dispute where a decision has been made by the 
domain name body might be more limited in their scope, in 
the nature of an appeal process rather than an initial ac-
tion.205 
We are under no illusions that the kind of coordination required to 
effectively regulate the domain name system will be simple or uncon-
tested. Yet if we are to maintain the value of the domain name system as a 
solution to the searching and selection problem, realspace sovereigns must 
recognize the urgent importance of coordination and deference, and tailor 
their regulatory approach accordingly. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It has become commonplace to describe our world (especially the eco-
nomic world) as “interdependent.” Increasingly, the flow of capital as well 
as goods and services show little respect for traditional sovereign borders; 
nations unable or unwilling to respond to economic changes can suffer 
harm at the hands of the global marketplace. 
The advent of the Internet as a powerful commercial and social me-
dium is likely to present still greater challenges. For the Internet brings 
                                                                                                                        
 203. See supra Section III.C.1.b. 
 204. The analogy here would be to administrative exhaustion principles. 
 205. Note that the ICANN UDRP proceedings explicitly allow parties the right to 
seek relief from a court prior to actions being taken against a domain name. See UDRP, 
supra note 129, ¶ 4(k). This is in the nature of granting an appellate right; we suggest that 
Congress may want to formalize such an appellate process as part of an effort to recog-
nize the authority of international domain name regulation. Cf. Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 
139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 7. 52-53 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that UDRP decisions do not fall 
within the limited scope of review for arbitration awards provided by the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act).  
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new meaning to “interdependent”:  in a world where geography is funda-
mental to our understandings of sovereignty, the contested aspects of 
online “territoriality” mean that regulation might occur everywhere, or 
even nowhere. In an era when the “effects” of a commercial dispute in cy-
berspace might be “felt” both everywhere and nowhere, realspace sover-
eigns have great power to affect the global progress of the Internet. And 
there is perhaps no nation with as much at stake in this game as the United 
States, and no nation with as much power to lead the community of na-
tions in determining the Internet’s future. 
Yet the evidence of the U.S. approach to date has not been altogether 
heartening. With respect to the regulation of domain names—perhaps the 
“canary in the coal mine” of global internet regulation—the U.S. appears, 
via enactment of the ACPA, and especially its self-styled in rem provi-
sions, to have acted in an ill-informed manner that may be contrary to its 
long-term interests. As we argued above, these statutory provisions suffer 
from the double ignominy of being both of little value206 and inapt.207  
We do not, however, believe that all is lost, or that the current U.S. ap-
proach to domain name regulation will inexorably lead to the segmenta-
tion of the domain name system. To the contrary, the mere presence of the 
ICANN dispute resolution mechanism as well as the absence (to date) of 
any serious attempts by other sovereigns208 to assert jurisdiction over do-
main names demonstrates that this problem is not unsolvable at an interna-
tional scale. But any discussion about the future of international regulation 
of domain names (and, in a larger sense, the Internet) must proceed with 
full awareness of the essential role that realspace sovereigns play in both 
the form and the content of any regulatory approach. 
                                                                                                                        
 206. Useless in the sense that anytime the section authorizing the in rem assertion of 
jurisdiction (over known persons) will be necessary, it will also violate the US Constitu-
tion to accept jurisdiction. See supra 94-98 and accompanying text. 
 207. Inapt in a strategic sense: because it works an aggressive approach to jurisdic-
tion over domain names that creates significant incentives for other countries to regulate, 
thus raising the possibility of segmenting the domain name system.  
 208. China may be the exception. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.  
